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Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior
David I. Walker*

Abstract
The power of financial accounting to shape corporate behavior is
underappreciated.Advocates ofpositive accountingtheory have arguedthateven
cosmetic changes in reportedearningscan affect share value, not because market
participants are unable to see through such changes to the underlying
fundamentals, but because of implicit or explicit contracts that are based on
reportedearnings and transactioncosts. However, agency theory suggests that
accountingchoices andcorporateresponses to accountingstandardchanges will
not necessarily be those that maximize share value. For a number of reasons,
including the fact that executive compensation is often tied to reportedearnings,
managerialpreferences for high earnings generally will exceed shareholder
preferences, leading to sharevalue reducing tradeoffs between reportedearnings
andnet cashflows. Empiricalevidence supportingthe detailedpredictionsofthese
theories is mixed, but the evidence firmly establishes the power of accountingto
shape corporatebehavior.
The power of accounting and the divergence of interests have many
implications for courts and policy makers. For example, consideration of
proposalsto increase conformity between tax andfinancialaccountingrules as a
means of combating tax shelteringand/orartificialearningsinflationmust take into
account the incentive properties of accounting standards and recognize that
narrowingthe gap between tax andbook income will have economic consequences
however the gap is narrowed This Article considersthis andother implicationsof
the behavioraleffects of accountingstandards,including the possibilityofsetting
accountingstandardsinstrumentallyas a means ofregulatingcorporatebehavior,
an alternativeto tax incentives, mandates, or direct subsidies.
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. I have benefited from the
helpful comments of Vic Fleischer, Keith Hylton, Calvin Johnson, Louis Kaplow, Leandra
Lederman, Mike Meurer, Alex Raskolnikov, Dan Shaviro, Lynn Stout, David Weber, Chuck
Whitehead, and participants in workshops at Boston University School of Law, Harvard Law
School, and New York University School of Law as well as the Canadian Law and Economics,
National Tax Association, and Junior Tax Scholars' Conferences. I thank Mark Gauthier for
excellent research assistance.
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I. Introduction
Financial accounting standards, choices, and results are vitally
important to the managers of U.S. public companies. Nonetheless, the
courts, policy makers, and legal scholars focusing on corporate law
generally ignore accounting whenever they are able-treating the subject as
a black box best left to accounting professionals-without recognizing the
impact of accounting on managerial decisionmaking and corporate
behavior. This is unfortunate. Corporate financial accounting is too
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important to be left (solely) to the accountants. Courts and policy makers
need to understand whether accounting standards and accounting decisions
matter, and if so, how; whether managerial sensitivity to reported earnings
reflects legitimate shareholder concerns, irrational behavior, or rational, but
self-serving behavior; and whether accounting standards can serve a useful
policy role in helping to shape managerial and corporate behavior.
Consider the following examples.
In a case described in many corporate law texts and treatises, Kamin v.
American Express Co.,' the company's directors voted to distribute to
shareholders some depreciated securities rather than selling the securities
and enjoying the benefit of a corporate tax loss. The plaintiffs' allegation,
accepted by the court in considering the defendants' summary judgment
motion, was that the directors had made a conscious decision to forgo about
$8 million in tax savings in order to avoid a $26 million reduction in
reported earnings, even though the $26 million loss had been suffered
economically and would be clearly reflected on the company's balance
sheet.2 Because the American Express shareholders would be unable to use
the tax loss, the primary beneficiary of this decision appeared to be the U.S.
Treasury. The directors justified sacrificing after-tax cash flow for higher
reported earnings, arguing that a $26 million "reduction of net income
would have a serious effect on the market value of the publicly traded
American Express stock."0
The court held that the board's good faith decision was protected by
the business judgment rule and dismissed the case.4 The court downplayed
the plaintiffs' allegation that some of the directors were company managers
whose compensation was based in part on reported earnings. 5 Was the
earnings/cash flow tradeoff in the Kamin case negligent? Was it even
rational? Should the court have been more skeptical that the decision was
1. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
2. The case involved shares of Donaldson, Lufken and Jenrette, Inc. that had declined in
value from $30 million to $4 million. Id at 809. The loss on the stock was water under the
bridge. The only question before the directors was whether the stock should be sold by
American Express, providing a tax benefit to offset other income, but also a reduction in
earnings; or distributed to shareholders as a dividend. Id. In the latter case, the alternative
selected by the directors, the tax benefit would be lost entirely-the shareholders would not be
entitled to use it-but American Express's loss on the stock would be reflected only on its
balance sheet, not on its income statement. Id. at 809-10.
3. Id.at 811.
4. Id.at 812.
5. See id.
(dismissing the claim that the decision was motivated by self-interest as being
"highly speculative").
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in good faith and not self-serving behavior on the part of the inside
directors?
Consider next the battle that has been waged during the last decade
over the accounting treatment of compensatory stock options. The
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the private body
empowered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to set
accounting standards, formally proposed in 1993 that stock option expense be
recorded and subtracted from reported earnings similar to all other compensation
expense.6 The corporate lobby managed to defer mandatory expensing for twelve
years until the FASB finally forced through a rule in 2004. 7
The effect of mandatory option expensing will be to reduce reported
earnings for companies that use options. Corporate interests opposing the new
standard have argued that expensing will reduce share values and drastically
reduce or preclude the use of options as a compensation device. 8 Some
economists argue that the accounting treatment is irrelevant and that managerial
resistance was irrational under traditional economic ways of thinking.9
Members of Congress weighed in on this one, but on both sides of the
question.' 0 Was managerial resistance to option expensing irrational or selfserving, or did it reflect legitimate concerns about the effect of expensing
options on share value?
Next, increased consistency between financial and tax accounting has been
proposed as a response both to tax sheltering and artificial earnings inflation.'
Differences between financial (or book) accounting and tax accounting allow
6.

FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT: PROPOSED STATEMENT OF

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, para. 1-

4 (Dec. 1993) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7.

See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING

STANDARDS No. 123, SHARE BASED PAYMENT 1,25-26 (rev. Dec. 2004) [hereinafter SFAS No.
123R] (mandating "fair value" accounting for stock options beginning in 2005 and 2006).
8. See, e.g., Wick Simmons, The Best Option, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31,2003, at AlO ("[I]f
companies are forced to treat options like salaries or manufacturing costs, many will decide they
can't afford to continue this form of potential compensation.").
9. See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: ManagerialPower
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 847, 860 (2002) (arguing that
"[t]here is substantial evidence that managers respond to accounting concerns in ways that seem
irrational to financial economists").
10. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., Economic Consequences of Accountingfor StockBased Compensation, 34 J. ACCT. RES. (SUP.) 1, 3-4 (1997) (discussing two opposing attempts
to legislate with respect to the matter).
11.
See, e.g., George K. Yin, Getting Serious About CorporateTax Shelters: Taking a
Lessonfrom History, 54 SMU L. REv. 209, 224-29 (2001); Mihir A. Desai, The Degradation of
Reported Corporate Profits 22 (July 2005) (unpublished working paper, on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=758144.
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firms to exploit tax shelters that decrease taxable income without affecting book
income and artificially inflate reported earnings without incurring higher
corporate taxes. Requiring firms to adopt the same accounting conventions for
both purposes would force them to trade off taxes against reported earnings.
Assuming some managerial discretion, commentators have generally assumed
that the primary result of increased book-tax conformity would be reduced
reported earnings because managers would act to minimize taxes and maximize
after-tax cash flows.' 2 Does this view properly reflect the importance of
reported earnings to management, or would shareholders likely suffer as a
result of increased book-tax conformity as managers forwent valid tax
deductions in order to keep reported earnings high? More importantly, what
would be the broader economic consequences of eliminating the gaps between
financial and tax accounting?
Finally, consider a hypothetical accounting standard change that has the
effect of decreasing reported expenses (and thus increasing reported
earnings) related to the purchase of a certain class of assets. Given
managerial sensitivity to reported earnings, as demonstrated in Kamin, the
stock option expensing saga, and numerous studies recounted below, would
such an accounting change serve as a valuable incentive device, perhaps as
an alternative to tax incentives? This Article argues that the stock option
accounting regime in place over the last decade acted as an accounting
incentive and helps explain the widespread use of options. This was largely
unintentional and probably not salutary, but the impact of accounting rules on
compensation design suggests the potential for instrumental use of
accounting.
At bottom, we have two primary questions: Do accounting rules affect
corporate behavior? And, if so, why? Thoughtful consideration of these
questions requires exploration of accounting theory and related empirical
evidence. Accounting theory seeks to explain how accounting standards affect
share prices and corporate behavior and how firms choose between permissible
standards. One aim of the first part of this Article is to introduce the legal
academic community to the dominant accounting theory over the last twenty
years-positive accounting theory-which employs transaction cost economics
12. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, GAAP Tax, 83 TAXNoTEs 425,427(1999) (arguing that
book-tax conformity would cause a significant drop in GAAP income); Yin, supra note 11, at
227 (noting that a tax based primarily on financial income could lead some companies to report
lower earnings to reduce taxes); Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformityfor
CorporateIncome: An Introductionto the Issues 28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. W1 1067, 2005) (noting that book-tax conformity could lead to a race to the bottom
on effective tax rates). To be sure, none of these sources suggest that firms would completely
ignore reported earnings, but the general tenor is that tax effects would likely dominate.
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to describe why accounting standards and practices would be relevant despite
the ability of the capital markets to "see through" various accounting
presentations to the underlying value of securities. 13 However, Part II also
emphasizes the importance of managerial agency costs in explaining accounting
choices that apparently reduce share value.
The empirical literature on accounting and corporate behavior, which this
Article reviews in detail in Part III, confirms that accounting rules and
procedures matter. Or, more importantly, managers act as if accounting
matters, and thus accounting rules affect corporate behavior. That evidence
includes additional examples of tax benefits being sacrificed to boost or
maintain earnings, as in Kamin; operational changes made as a result of
changes in accounting standards; and survey responses in which managers
admit sacrificing cash flow for earnings. However, although some of the
evidence is consistent with share value enhancing aspects of positive
accounting theory, much of the evidence is equally consistent with a managerdriven or agency cost theory of accounting choice. To put it bluntly,
accounting clearly matters; it is less clear why.
However, despite the empirical uncertainty, we cannot punt on the
motivational question. In evaluating corporate decisions, like those in Kamin
or managerial opposition to stock option expensing, it is obvious that
accounting matters; the issue is whether these actions can possibly be in the
shareholders' interests. Part IV of this Article argues that a share valuemaximizing account is improbable in such cases. Based on our current
understanding of accounting theory and evidence, we cannot be certain that the
American Express directors in Kamin were negligent or disloyal, or that
managerial opposition to stock option accounting was largely self-serving, but
that suspicion is reasonable.
Part V of this Article considers the behavioral effects of accounting in the
context of increased book-tax conformity. Positive accounting theory suggests
that firms seeking to maximize share value in a world of increased conformity
would not adopt a strategy of ignoring reported earnings and minimizing taxes.
However, this Article argues that managers would go even further in sacrificing

13. Infra Part II.B. See generally Ross L. WATrs & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, PosInVE
ACCOUNTING THEORY (1986); Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting
Theory: A Ten Year Perspective, 65 ACCT. REv. 131 (1990).

Although legal academics generally are familiar with the efficient capital markets
hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model, which form the basis of modem accounting
theory, references in the legal literature to positive accounting theory are rare. A "terms and
connectors" search of the "Journals & Law Reviews Combined" database in Westlaw for
"positive accounting theory" produces only ten hits.
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tax benefits for higher reported earnings, in4 all likelihood forgoing legitimate
tax deductions and impairing share value.'
More importantly, irrespective of why accounting matters, Part V argues
that we should think of financial accounting standards as creating incentives
just like the tax rules. Thus, differences between the two sets of rules, such as
depreciation rules that allow firms acquiring capital assets to report higher
earnings to investors than to the tax authorities, can be thought of as tax
incentives, accounting incentives, or both. And increased book-tax conformity,
whether achieved by conforming tax with book, book with tax, or something in
between, could have adverse consequences for the economy.
Once we recognize that financial accounting standards have strong
behavioral effects and economic consequences, the natural question to ask is
whether this power should be harnessed and explicit accounting incentives
embraced as a public policy tool, a supplement to the direct subsidies,
mandates, and tax incentives currently used by Congress to shape corporate
behavior. This provocative idea is considered in Part VI.
Financial accounting incentives could be powerful levers and could reach
organizations indifferent to tax incentives. But there would be costs. First,
purposeful deviation from economic accounting, the accounting treatment that
most closely follows the economics of the transaction, would result in
degradation of the information content of accounting statements and greater
costs to the users of these statements.1 5 A second potential cost lies in the
introduction of additional lobbying into the accounting standard-setting process
and the possibility of regulatory capture by the interest group with the most at
stake-management. 16 In many ways the costs and benefits of providing
explicit accounting incentives and tax incentives are similar. The difference is
that mixed purposes, congressional involvement, and the attendant lobbying
and capture issues are unavoidable in the tax realm, or perhaps more
importantly, are irretrievably entrenched. This is not the case for financial
accounting, which is subject to much less political infighting today than is tax.
Thus, although an omniscient, benevolent, and disinterested power could
increase social welfare through judicious manipulation of accounting rules, we
must recognize that Congress is not such a power. While remaining open to the
possibility of instrumental accounting, this Article concludes, for now, that

14. InfraPart V. Negative earnings effects possibly exert greater influence over discrete,
one-time decisions, such as major asset dispositions, than ongoing activities, such as the choice
of an accounting method.
15. Infra Part VI.C.2.
16. Infra Part VI.C.3.
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social welfare is probably best served by minimizing consideration of
nonaccounting consequences in the standard-setting process.

II. Accounting Theory
Public companies prepare audited financial statements that are relied upon
by investors and others. Most important are the income statement, which
summarizes a company's performance over the previous year or quarter, and
the balance sheet, which provides a snapshot of the overall financial position of
the company as of the end of the period. The numbers that receive the greatest
attention in the financial press are the net profits or earnings figures from the
income statement, often portrayed as earnings per share of stock outstanding.
The art of accounting, though, lies in the detail, in determining how various
transactions-purchases, sales, leases, commitments to retirees, etc.-are to be
accounted for. Accountants rely on a body of rules known as generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). As the name implies, many of these
rules have not been mandated but have become accepted by the accounting
profession over time. Ultimately, however, the SEC is responsible for
maintaining the integrity of the securities markets and has delegated to the
FASB the power to promulgate mandatory and permissive rules of accounting
practice as needed. As a result, companies today face an array of mandatory
rules as well as choices between generally accepted treatments in preparing
their financial statements.
Accounting theory seeks to explain how accounting standards affect share
prices and corporate behavior and how firms choose between permissible
standards. Our analysis begins with an exploration of the well-known efficient
capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) and the less well-known (to legal
academics, anyway) positive accounting theory. These theories suggest that
accounting matters not because stock valuation is directly affected by
accounting choices or standards but because contracts and regulatory costs
depend explicitly or implicitly on reported earnings, and these arrangements are
sticky. Because of transaction costs, reported earnings can have an indirect
effect on share prices. Next, this Part argues that corporate decisionmakers
have additional incentives beyond share price maximization to prefer higher
Ultimately, the
reported earnings, including earnings-based bonuses.
relationship between financial accounting and corporate behavior depends on
managerial agency costs as well as other transaction costs.
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A. The Efficient CapitalMarkets Hypothesis and the CapitalAssets
PricingModel

Accounting and finance researchers generally believe that a change in
accounting standards or practices that increases or decreases reported earnings,
but has no impact on cash flow, transaction costs, or on the information
provided to the marketplace, should have no effect on stock prices. 7 Securities
markets should see through such cosmetic accounting adjustments to the
directly
underlying fundamentals that determine valuation. This view follows
8
(CAPM).1
model
pricing
asset
capital
the
and
ECMH
the
from
The CAPM simply assumes that the value of a company, and hence its
stock price, is a function of the cash flows and rates of return that are expected
over time. 19 There are three versions of the ECMH. The weak form holds that
securities prices reflect all information incorporated in past prices. The semistrong form of the ECMH holds that securities prices reflect all published
information. The strong form holds that prices reflect all discoverable
information.2 ° If we limit our inquiry to changes in accounting standards and
choices that involve only the presentation of published information, we need
only accept the semi-strong version of the ECMH to conclude that accounting
has no direct effect on stock valuation. 2 ' Although there is some evidence to
the contrary, most economists believe that markets are at least semi-strong
efficient.22
17. Some accounting decisions, such as the choice between last-in, first-out (LIFO) and
first-in, first-out (FIFO) inventory accounting, affect a firm's tax burden and after-tax cash
flow. WATTs & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 73. These accounting decisions would be
expected to have share price implications under this theory.
18. See, e.g., id. at 72-74 (discussing the capital structure irrelevance proposition);
Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 132-33 (discussing accounting irrelevance theory).
19. WATrs & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 72-74.
20.

See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 337 (8th ed.

2006) (discussing the three forms of market efficiency).
21. For example, suppose firms ABC and XYZ are identical except for their
accounting for an expense of $0.10 per share. ABC reports earnings of $1.00 per share
and discloses the $0. 10 per share expense in the footnotes to its accounting statements.
XYZ subtracts the expense in its income statement reporting earnings of $0.90 per share.
Under the naive investor view that runs counter to the semi-strong ECMH, XYZ would
trade for less than ABC. Suppose that the price-to-earnings ratio for firms in this industry
with prospects and risks similar to ABC and XYZ is 20. Under the naive investor view,
ABC would trade at $20 per share, while XYZ would trade for $18 per share. However,
because the expense is fully disclosed in both cases, the semi-strong version of the ECMH
predicts that these firms would have an identical share price. The market would treat each
as earning $0.90 per share.
22. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 20, at 337-39 (discussing the research on the semi-
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Lynn Stout, Lawrence Cunningham, and others have argued that markets
may not be as efficient as economists generally presume,2 3 yet these criticisms
do not undermine the modest claim made above. Stout's critique is primarily
directed at assertions of strong form market efficiency and an even stronger
view called fundamental value efficiency. 24 The latter is the theory that prices
not only reflect all available information but also provide the best estimate of
the fundamental value of the underlying asset.2 5 Fundamental value efficiency
is difficult to square with market corrections, so these criticisms are well taken.
But in considering the differential impact of competing accounting standards or
choices, we are not concerned with fundamental equity values, only with the
impact of accounting on stock prices relative to one another or from one period
to another. With regard to these issues, Stout argues that the cost of arbitrage
and of acquiring and processing information, particularly technical information,
undermines the efficiency with which information is impounded into prices.26
Although I agree with Stout's criticisms as applied to strong form market
efficiency theory, and perhaps to some examples of semi-strong efficiency, I am
skeptical of her argument that accounting practices affect stock prices because
of informational inefficiency. As an example of an accounting practice that
may affect prices if markets are informationally inefficient, Stout mentions the
debate over the treatment of compensatory stock options.27 This debate centers
on whether stock option expense should be deducted from reported earnings in

strong form of the efficient-market hypothesis); Thomas D. Fields et al., Empirical
Research on Accounting Choice, 31 J. ACcT. & EcoN. 255, 279-81 (2001) (noting that
research in the 1970s supported market efficiency; that researchers in the 1980s and early 1990s
assumed efficiency and looked for other explanations for why accounting would matter, i.e.,
positive accounting theory; and that some evidence produced in the 1990s is inconsistent with
efficient markets and investor rationality, but that this evidence is insufficient to draw strong
inferences); S.P. Kothari, CapitalMarkets Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & EcON. 105,
120-21 (2001) (noting anomalies that challenge the ECMH, such as the tendency of markets to
under-react to earnings surprises, but pointing out methodological concerns with such studies).
23. For their arguments, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, BehavioralFinanceandInvestor
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 767 (2002), and Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of
Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance,28 J. CoRp. L. 635 (2003).
24. See Stout, supra note 23, at 637, 639 (describing the most common definition of an
efficient market as one that reflects all available information); see also id. at 639-50 (critiquing
the fundamental value efficiency view).
25. See id. at 640 (differentiating between "informational efficiency" and "fundamental
value efficiency").
26. Id. at 651-56. Stout also explores the effects of heterogeneous investor expectations
and investor irrationality on efficient market claims, but these limitations on efficiency, if
significant, pose less of a challenge to the semi-strong model. See generally id. pts. II, IV.
27. Id.at657n.100.
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the body of the financial statement, as the FASB now requires, 28 or only
reported in the footnotes to the accounting statements. It is important to
recognize, however, that the "footnote" provided exactly the same information
that is provided in the body of company financial statements under the new
rule. Formerly, companies that did not "expense" options were required to
present pro forma income statements revealing the net income and earnings per
share figures that would have resulted had options been expensed. 29 Thus,
while I agree with Stout that the cost of acquiring and processing information
can limit market efficiency in some circumstances, it is difficult to understand
how an income statement found on page three of the financial statement is any
more informative than the exact same statement found on page thirty.3 °
Of course, the stock option expensing example is the toughest case for
those arguing that accounting standards affect stock prices because of
informational inefficiencies. Other changes to accounting standards could have
greater impact on the information presented to investors. I think we can safely
say, however, that a change in standards that has no material effect on the
information available to investors should have no direct effect on stock prices.
Similarly, it is difficult to understand how the accounting issue presented
in Kamin could have had any direct effect on the stock price of American
Express. Recall that the directors chose to distribute rather than sell
depreciated securities the company was holding as an investment.31 Sale of the
28.

Infra note 95 and accompanying text.

29. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS No. 123: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION para. 45 (Oct. 1995)

[hereinafter SFAS No. 123] (setting forth the reporting requirements). Returning to the example
above, see supra note 21, if the $0.10 per share expense is related to compensatory stock
options, the footnoting option would allow ABC to report earnings of $1.00 per share in its
income statement, but ABC would be required to report pro forma earnings of $0.90 per share in
the footnotes to its financial statements.
30. The location of disclosure could affect the information provided to the market if
footnoted information is deemed to be less important or reliable than information provided in
the body of the financial statement. See Anwer S. Ahmed et al., Does Recognition Versus
Disclosure Matter? Evidence from Value-Relevance of Banks' Recognized and Disclosed

DerivativeFinancialInstruments, 81 ACCT. REv. 567, 568-69 (2006) (finding evidence that
recognized derivative instruments are more value-relevant than disclosed-but-unrecognized
derivatives and suggesting that the difference may be related to reliability or costs of
information processing). However, in the case of footnoted option expense, the calculation
methods were tightly controlled by the FASB and market participants should have realized that
but for political opposition, the FASB would have required option expensing in the body of
financial statements years ago. Thus, the placement of option expense information should not
have provided any material information to the market.
31. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (discussing
the facts of the case).
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securities would have provided a potential $8 million tax benefit, but also
would have reduced reported earnings by $26 million.32 Perhaps if the
directors had been able to hide the investment loss from analysts by distributing
the securities, the impact on the price of American Express shares might have
been dampened. American Express stockholders, however, appeared to have
been well aware of the economic loss that had been suffered. The company had
announced that the depreciated securities would be distributed in kind as a
special dividend and apparently had provided enough information for some
shareholders to realize that this action would result in the company forgoing a
sizeable tax benefit.33 Ultimately, the board held a special meeting to
reconsider distribution versus sale.34 Can there be any doubt at this point that
the economic loss suffered had been fully incorporated in the stock price of
American Express and that the additional step of reducing corporate earnings
by the amount of the loss would have provided no new information to the
market?
There can be no real doubt. Nonetheless, Lawrence Cunningham argues
that the American Express directors still may have outsmarted the market by
distributing the securities and that their action reflected healthy skepticism
about market efficiency. 35 The thrust of his and other similar arguments is that
investor cognitive biases-including loss aversion (the tendency to place
greater importance on losses than gains), overconfidence (the belief that we are
all better than average drivers, stock pickers, etc.), and availability (the
tendency to place greater weight on more recent events)--undermine the
efficiency of the capital markets.36 However, Cunningham does not explain
which cognitive bias would cause "market participants [to] focus on the income
statement and earnings per share rather than on the balance sheet and owner's
equity, 37 and it is not obvious which, if any, cognitive bias would be at work
here. Perhaps some investors overconfidently rely on raw earnings numbers or
rely excessively on reported earnings and discount footnotes and balance sheets
because the latter are less salient. But this sounds less like bias and more like
32. Id. at 809-10.
33. Id.
34. Id.at 813-14.
35. Cunningham, supra note 23, at 823-24.
36. See id. at 775, 783 (discussing investor biases); see also BREALEY ET AL., supra note
20, at 337-39 (same). As Stout notes, the behavioral finance field has experienced explosive
growth. I cite Cunningham as one example because he has specifically referenced the Kamin
case, but many others could be cited. See Stout, supra note 23, at 660 nn. 115-17 (naming
behavioral finance sources).
37. Cunningham, supra note 23, at 823-24.
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laziness. More generally, while evidence exists that market participants suffer
from cognitive biases, it is not clear that these biases affect market prices.38
B. PositiveAccounting Theory
A believer in the semi-strong view of the ECMH might be tempted to
conclude from the foregoing discussion that accounting standards and
accounting choices are irrelevant, and this irrelevancy view held sway in the
academic community for many years. 39 However, researchers investigating
company choices among acceptable accounting alternatives found enough
systematic variation to doubt the irrelevance theory and seek alternative
explanations. For example, firm size and leverage (the ratio of corporate debt
to equity) both appear to be associated with accounting choice, a result at odds
with an irrelevancy view of accounting. 40 Findings such as these led
researchers to search for indirect effects of accounting on share value, a
movement known as positive accounting theory.4 '
The ECMH only says that the securities markets see through cosmetic
accounting changes. This does not necessarily mean that reported earnings are
irrelevant. Theorists note that some corporate contracts are tied to reported
42
earnings, including debt covenants and executive compensation agreements.
38. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 20, at 343-47 (questioning behavioral finance
explanations for market anomalies and noting, inter alia, that financial institutions employ
behavioral finance experts to assist them in overcoming those biases).
To be fair, many finance executives apparently share Stout's and Cunningham's skepticism
regarding the efficiency of the capital markets. As discussed more fully below, a recent survey
of over 400 CFOs, treasurers, and other financial executives found that most were willing to
forgo positive net present value projects in order to achieve quarterly earnings targets. John R.
Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting 14-15 (Jan. 11,
2005) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). A
majority of the executives expressed a belief that failure to achieve quarterly earnings targets
adversely affects a company's share price because such failure undermines confidence in
management. Id. at 14. Some of the respondents doubted the ability or willingness of even
sophisticated investors to look through managed earnings to the underlying cash flows. Id at
26-27.
39. See Robert W. Holthausen & Richard W. Leftwich, The Economic Consequencesof
Accounting Choice, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 77, 80 (1983) (discussing early tests finding no stock
price reaction to changes in accounting techniques except for changes affecting taxes); Watts &
Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 132-34.
40. See Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 39, at 79 (discussing the systematic
relationship between firm specifics and accounting choice).
41. See Watts & Zimmerman, supranote 13, at 133 ("To predict and explain accounting
choice researchers had to introduce information and/or transaction costs.").
42. See id. at 133 (discussing factors affecting accounting choice). For a discussion of

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

941

Renegotiating these contracts to adjust for accounting changes can be costly,
while failure to renegotiate in the face of a purely accounting-driven change in
earnings can be costly as well. 43 In addition, if an accounting-driven increase in
reported earnings is difficult to distinguish from an increase in profits arising
from business fundamentals, the earnings bump could have political
ramifications, such as increased exposure to tax hikes. 44 Finally, mandatory
accounting changes that reduce the freedom to select optimal accounting
techniques could reduce the value of financial statements for private
contracting. 4 All of these indirect effects of reported earnings on share value
are referred to as contracting costs in the positive accounting theory literature.
Transaction costs resulting from sticky contracts and political costs
resulting from an apparent surge in profits affect a company's cash flows.
Thus, this explanation is perfectly consistent with the ECMH and CAPM. In
developing the accounting irrelevance theory, scholars had assumed that
accounting standards and practices did not affect transaction costs. The
advance made by positive accounting theorists was to eliminate this simplifying
assumption and begin to explain the relevance of accounting to share price.4 6
Consider the impact of accounting on corporate debt covenants.
Traditionally, these covenants were based on GAAP accounting, which means
that they were tied to reported earnings, and they usually were based on
"rolling" GAAP, that is, GAAP in effect at the time of calculation.47

associated contracting costs, see Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 39, at 84-88.
43. See WATrs & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 215, 215 n.4 (discussing the costs of
renegotiating a debt contract as well as the costs of a breach in the absence of renegotiation).
44. See id. at 222-23 (discussing the relationship between accounting practices and the
political process).
45. Id. at 219; Daniel W. Collins et al., The Economic Determinants of the Market
Reaction to Proposed Mandatory Accounting Changes in the Oil and Gas Industry: A CrossSectional Analysis, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 37, 43 (1981). In addition, a change in accounting
standards may affect the reliability of information provided to the markets. New standards that
reduce reliability would have a negative effect on firm value by increasing contracting costs
generally. Hassan Espahbodi et al., Impact on Equity Prices of Pronouncements Related to
Nonpension Postretirement Benefits, 14 J. ACCT. & ECoN. 323, 327 (1991).
46. An obvious analogy exists between the evolution of positive accounting theory and
positive finance theory. Miller and Modigliani demonstrated in 1961 that corporate financing
decisions, such as dividend payout policies, are irrelevant in the absence of transaction costs.
Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, DividendPolicy, Growth and the Valuation ofShares,
34J. Bus. 411,431-32(1961). Subsequent researchers demonstrated that taxes, agency costs,
and other imperfections in the market render corporate finance relevant. BREALEY ETAL., supra
note 20, at 415-35.
47. Richard Leftwich, Evidence of the Impact of Mandatory Changes in Accounting
Principles on CorporateLoan Agreements, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 6 (1981). Presumably,
rolling GAAP was preferred to "frozen" GAAP because of the added cost of maintaining non-
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Renegotiation of debt covenants would be difficult and costly, particularly with
respect to covenants associated with publicly held debt, which generally require
for amendment a two-thirds vote of the outstanding debt.48 Violation of debt
covenants could be costly as well, resulting in restrictions on the payment of
dividends, limitations on merger activity, and other adverse consequences. 49
Thus, an accounting choice, an operational decision, or a mandatory change in
accounting standards that reduced earnings could reduce firm value by
increasing the risk of costly debt covenant violations, even if the earnings
reduction was completely cosmetic. As Richard Leftwich pointed out,
reduction in firm value should not exceed the lesser of the cost of renegotiating
the covenants, redeeming the debt (if possible), default, or adjusting operations
to avoid default. 50 Unless renegotiation was costless, however, an incomereducing accounting change would reduce the value of a firm with the debt
covenants described to some extent.
As suggested in the next Part, much effort has gone into attempts to verify
the debt covenant hypothesis, and it is clear that there is something to this story.
Many studies have shown that corporate leverage helps predict accounting
choices and operating decisions with accounting implications in ways
consistent with the theory. However, there is reason to believe that the role of
debt and debt covenants in accounting choice is waning. First, several studies
indicate that the use of covenants restricting bond issuers from paying
dividends or incurring additional debt has declined substantially in recent
years. 5' Second, one study has demonstrated that fixed or frozen GAAP
covenants have increased in prevalence.5 2 Both of these changes reduce the
GAAP accounts for the purpose of policing debt covenants.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. Id. at 7.
51.

See Joy Begeley & Ruth Freedman, The ChangingRole ofAccounting Numbers in

Public Lending Agreements, 18 AcCT. HORIZONs 81, 82 (2004) (examining public debt
issuances and finding that the presence of accounting-based restrictions on paying dividends
and incurring additional debt fell from about half of issuances in the late 1970s, to about a
quarter in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to less than 10% in 1999-2000); Robert C. Nash et
al., DeterminantsofContractualRelations Between ShareholdersandBondholders: Investment
Opportunitiesand Restrictive Covenants, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 201, 218 tbl.3 (2003) (examining a

sample of bonds issued in 1989 and 1996 by U.S. companies and finding that the use of
covenants restricting dividend payments declined from 40% to 21%, while the use of covenants
limiting additional borrowing declined from 40% to 27%).
52. See Mary Beth Mohrman, The Use of FixedGAAP Provisionsin Debt Contracts, 10
ACCT. HoRIzoNs 78, 84 (1996) (finding an increasing tendency to fix accounting methods in

debt contracts with over 50% of contracts executed after 1982 containing fixed GAAP
provisions).
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aggregate cost to U.S. companies of accounting changes, choices, or
operational decisions that reduce reported earnings.
Moreover, the various contracting costs that have been identified do not all
run in the same direction. For example, Watts and Zimmerman postulated that
firms would wish to keep reported earnings low to stave off tax increases,
suggesting that income-reducing standard changes or accounting choices would
reduce political costs. 53 If renegotiation of executive compensation agreements
is costly, mandatory accounting changes that reduce reported earnings would be
resisted by management, but the effect on firm value would be ambiguous. At
one level reducing reported earnings in an environment of sticky compensation
contracts should increase firm value by reducing compensation payments. On
the other hand, reducing incentive compensation could adversely affect firm
value. The optimal contracting story has no directional prediction. Under this
theory, mandatory standard changes that reduce accounting choices reduce firm
54
value whether the new standard results in higher or lower reported earnings.

C. Shareholderand ManagerAppetite for Earnings
In the absence of transaction costs, cosmetic accounting changes would
have no impact on share value, and loyal directors would simply ignore the
impact of their decisions on reported earnings. The decision to sacrifice cash
flow for earnings, as in Kamin, would clearly run counter to shareholder
interests. Once we introduce positive accounting theory, however, the picture
is more complex. Assuming that contracting costs are nontrivial, loyal
managers would need to balance earnings effects against other cash flow
effects, and even cosmetic changes in accounting could affect share value.
Let's assume that debt covenant costs dominate other contracting costs so
that a reduction in reported earnings resulting from operational decisions or a
mandatory change in accounting standards reduces firm value. Share value
maximization would require managers to take these costs into account. But
there are conflicting forces. As in Kamin, steps taken to increase reported
earnings often result in increased taxes. A proposed change in accounting
standards may decrease reported earnings and increase the expected cost of
default on debt covenants, but opposing the change may entail monetary and
53.

WATTS &

ZIMMERMAN,

supra note 13, at 231.

Cf Simon Romero & Edmund L.

Andrews, At Exxon Mobil, a Record Profit but No Fanfare,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at Al
(covering Exxon Mobil's announcement of a record $36 billion in annual profits and efforts by
the company to play down the news).
54.

WATTS

& ZIMMERMAN, supranote 13, at 219-20.

64 WASH. & LEE L. REV 927 (2007)
perhaps political costs. Thus, while shareholders will have some appetite for
accounting-induced increases in reported earnings, this appetite will be
tempered by other costs. Share value will be maximized by maximizing aftertax cash flow, but this requires striking a balance between the contracting costs
associated with reported earnings and other cash flow effects. The optimal
point on the continuum between earnings maximization and maximization of
other cash flows will depend on firm characteristics. For example, firms that
are highly leveraged will face relatively greater costs from reduced reported
earnings. Of course, even calculating the optimal point along this continuum is
costly, and for some firms, share value may indeed be maximized by simply
ignoring the effect of reported earnings (perhaps the case for unleveraged
companies) or by maximizing reported earnings and ignoring cash flow
(unlikely, but conceivably the case for highly leveraged firms in the vicinity of
insolvency).
In a world without agency costs, managers' appetites for reported earnings
would mirror that of shareholders, but in the real world, we should expect
managers to have a stronger appetite than shareholders for earnings. First, and
most obviously, managerial compensation may depend on reported earnings,
independent of the effect of earnings on share price. Accounting-based
bonuses have a long pedigree and remain common today.55 Reported earnings
often factor into managerial bonuses both as an element in bonus calculations
and as a ceiling on bonus payouts. 56 In fact, studies consistently demonstrate
that earnings, earnings per share, and related measures such as earnings before
income taxes are the most commonly employed performance measures for
executive bonuses.57
55. See Susan Eichen & Eric Scoones, Annual Incentive PlanDesign Considerations,in
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 35, 37, 49-50 (Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002)
(noting that the "vast majority" of U.S. companies maintain annual incentive plans and that
financial measures of performance-principally income-based measures-are among the most
commonly used metrics in these plans).
56. JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, ACCOUNTING FOR DECISION MAKING AND CONTROL 185
(1995).
57. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS
2485, 2500-03 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (reporting results of a 1996-1997
Towers Perrin survey of 177 large U.S. corporations); see also Christopher D. Ittner et al., The
Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts, 72 ACCT, REV. 231, 238-40
(1997) (analyzing bonus plans of 317 firms for 1993 and 1994 and reporting that the three most
popular financial performance measures for CEO bonuses were earnings per share, net income,
and operating income); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government
Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 466 tbl.4
(2001) (finding that earnings-including net income, net profit, and net income minus
nonrecurring events-and earnings per share were the most commonly employed performance
measures for determining CEO bonuses for a random sample of S&P 500 and MidCap 400
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In recent years, of course, equity-based compensation has grown to
overshadow traditional bonuses (although accounting-based bonuses generally
have not been reduced, much to the consternation of corporate pay critics).5
However, the latest trend is to tie receipt of equity-based pay to accounting
performance, increasing the sensitivity of managerial compensation to financial
accounting. Thirty percent of major U.S. corporations recently surveyed by
Mercer Consulting based a portion of CEO equity compensation on the
achievement of accounting-based performance targets.5 9 For example, stock
option grants increasingly are made contingent on a corporation's achievement
of earnings, revenue growth, or other financial targets.6 °
In addition, high reported income may have an indirect effect on a
manager's compensation. Even if information presentation has no direct effect
on stock prices and little direct effect on compensation, managers may be able
to use high reported earnings as a factor in negotiating additional
compensation. Compensation consultants working for senior executives are
masters at identifying the metrics that allow their bosses to report better than
61
average performance, justifying higher than average compensation.
Artificially inflating reported earnings is one way to shine relative to one's
peers.
Positive accounting theorists have long recognized that managers of firms
with earnings-based bonuses will tend to choose earnings-increasing accounting
practices and favor earnings-increasing standards.62 The more general point
that even executives of companies that lack explicit earnings-based bonuses
will share these motivations has not been widely recognized in the accounting
firms in 1995).
58. According to a recent study, equity-based compensation accounted for 72% of total
compensation paid to the top five executives of S&P 500 companies in 2000 and 2001, and then
declined to 55% of total compensation for 2003, the last year of data reported. Lucian Bebchuk
& Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OxFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 283, 290
(2005). This study also found that although average equity-based pay received by CEOs of
S&P 500, Mid-Cap 500, and Small-Cap 600 companies nearly tripled between 1993 and 2003,
cash compensation still increased by about 40% across this period. Id. at 291.
59. Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO Pay More Tightly to Performance-OptionsGrants
May Depend on Meeting FinancialGoals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2006, at Al.

60.
61.

Id.
For a discussion of the influence of compensation consultants, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK

& JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 71 (2004); GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF

EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 42-50 (1991); and Lucian Arye

Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 790-91 (2002).
62. Watts& Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 138; WATTS& ZIMMERMAN, supranote 13, at
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literature, perhaps because it is a difficult proposition to test. However, it is
important to recognize the difference between this account and the other
contracting cost stories. Assuming that accounting-induced increases in
executive compensation do not provide commensurate increases in
productivity, an earnings-increasing change in accounting standards or
practices tends to reduce share value because of the increased compensation
payout. But despite the reduction in share value, the executive decisionmakers
may very well favor the change because they receive a portion of the increased
compensation that results. Here, there is a divergence of interests between
managers and shareholders that does not arise in examining the impact of
reported earnings on debt contracts or political costs. This is still a transaction
cost story, but in the agency cost vein.63
Of course, if executive compensation agreements were set in an efficient
market, managers could not profit from earnings-increasing changes in
accounting practices or standards.
Pay contracts would be adjusted
accordingly. But theory and evidence suggest that this market is not perfectly
efficient; that to some extent, managers control the pay-setting process; and that
overall pay levels may be capped by investor or financial press outrage, in
which case subtle means of increasing compensation, such as through
64
manipulating earnings-based bonuses, may be effective.
This view suggests that in some cases, management's primary concern
with a proposed accounting change may be that the new rule will result in
increased exposure and scrutiny of certain elements of their compensation.
Consider the FASB's decision to require companies to shift stock option
expense reporting from footnote to income statement. This change will reduce
earnings, and it could have negative effects on earnings-based bonuses and
other forms of compensation. But perhaps more importantly, the new reporting
requirement may make option compensation more visible to corporate critics
and shareholder advocates, which may result in pressure on directors to limit
options.65 Thus, resistance to stock option expensing may appear to reflect a
stronger managerial appetite for earnings than truly exists.
63. For the seminal article on the manager-shareholder agency problem, see Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
64. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 61, at 68-70 (discussing ways in which increased
compensation is camouflaged to prevent investor outrage); Bebchuk et al., supra note 61, at
786-88 (discussing outrage as a constraint on executive compensation).
65. See Dechow et al., supra note 10, at 18 (concluding that managerial resistance to
stock option expensing was driven by concerns relating to the scrutiny of option compensation);
see also Bebchuk et al., supranote 61, at 813 (arguing that salience is a critical factor limiting
executive compensation). For further discussion, see infra notes 117-19 and accompanying
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Direct compensation aside, managers may have other reasons for seeking
high reported earnings. For example, some managers may hold an honest, but
mistaken, belief that information presentation directly affects stock prices.
They may subscribe to the naYve investor view of the market that runs counter
to the semi-strong version of the ECMH and holds that investors take earnings
at face value and reward firms that report high earnings with high share prices.
Obviously, managers who honestly thought that reported earnings directly
affected their stock price would place a high value on increasing those
earnings. 66
Finally, managers may be socialized into placing inordinate importance on
earnings, achieving earnings targets, and maintaining steady earnings
improvements by the focus of stock analysts on these metrics. Of course, all
else being equal, higher earnings should translate into a higher stock price.
One can easily imagine, however, that over time high earnings could become a
goal in and of itself.
These final two points are related. A large majority of respondents in a
recent survey of over 400 financial executives stated that meeting quarterly
earnings targets helps to maintain or increase stock prices. 67 The CFOs
apparently believe that, at least in the short run, stock analysts punish firms that
fail to deliver promised earnings.68 The executives had a rational explanation
for this effect-because all firms manage earnings to some extent and typically
have sufficient reserves to achieve their earnings targets, failure to do so
suggests hidden problems at the firm or poor management. 69 But the more
important point is that managers link short-term stock performance and
reported earnings.70
There are no obvious reasons why managers would have less of an
appetite than shareholders for earnings, or at least no systematic reasons. 7' At
text.
66. Of course, some shareholders may take this view as well. Thus, references to the
"shareholders'" appetite for earnings should be read as the preferences of sophisticated longterm investors.
67. See Graham et al., supranote 38, at tbl.4 (finding that 82% of respondents agreed or
strongly agreed with this statement).
68. Id. at 26.
69. 1d. at 13.
70. Id. at 15.
71. Depending on bonus plan structure, managers may have an incentive to reduce
reported earnings in a particular period. Imagine that a manager's annual bonus opportunity is
dependent on company earnings exceeding a particular threshold and that it becomes obvious
that the threshold will not be exceeded for year X. In that case, the manager has an incentive to
accelerate expenses from year X+ I to year X. Taking a "big bath" in year X will have no impact
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times, accounting results may provide an excuse or cover for managers to
achieve other objectives, and excuses may be predicated on earnings-decreasing
changes in accounting. For example, a 1990 change in accounting for postretirement health care benefits resulted in a substantial increase in reported
expenses. 72 The implementation of this change was followed by massive cuts
in these benefits. The accounting change may have provided the political cover
needed to implement these cuts. However, this Machiavellian story is
undermined by the observation that managers vociferously opposed the
adoption of this accounting standard.73 Moreover, the excuse theory works
both ways. As noted above, managerial resistance to stock option expensing,
an earnings-decreasing change, may have arisen in part from a desire to
minimize the salience of managerial compensation.
Given the directional ambiguity of the accounting-as-excuse story and all
the other reasons for managers to have a stronger appetite than shareholders for
earnings, we should expect the distribution of managerial preferences along the
continuum between maximizing reported earnings and maximizing other cash
flows to be shifted in the direction of earnings maximization, relative to
shareholder preferences. Assuming a divergence between shareholder and
manager preferences, how do firms respond in situations in which earnings and
cash flow concerns conflict? The resolution depends on the severity of the
managerial agency problem in any given firm, which is a function of incentives
and corporate governance.74 Perversely, managers of firms that have more
closely linked executive pay to earnings in order to align managerial incentives
with those of shareholders are more likely to sacrifice cash flow for reported
earnings.7 5 But among firms with similar pay practices, we should expect
on her bonus for that year, but will increase the likelihood of exceeding the earnings threshold
and receiving a bonus for year X+ 1. See generally Timothy W. Koch & Larry D. Wall, The Use
of Accruals to Manage Reported Earnings: Theory and Evidence (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2000-23, 2000). Note, however, that the "big bath" phenomenon
does not suggest that managers would prefer earnings-reducing accounting standard changes.
Generally, managers prefer to report high earnings.
72. Infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
73. See Stephen A. Zeff, The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The PoliticalForcesBehind the
Professional Standards,CPA J., Feb. 2005, at 18, 25-26 (recounting strong opposition by
industry to this change in accounting standards but noting that "afterwards, companies conceded
its constructive effect on their decision making").
74. Jensen & Meckling, supranote 63, at 328-29. See generally Bebchuk et al., supra
note 61.
75. This phenomenon demonstrates the intractability of the managerial agency problem.
As with the arcade game "Whac-a-Mole," efforts to combat shirking, excessive perquisite
consumption, and similar agency problems by tying executive pay to financial results can result
in unexpected agency problems popping up elsewhere.
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better governed firms to more closely track shareholder preferences and exhibit
relatively less appetite for earnings relative to more poorly governed firms. In
fact, one can imagine that, in many cases, shareholder preferences for earnings
per se are negligible, while managerial preferences are considerable, leading to
quite different earnings management behavior between well and poorly
governed firms. I am not aware of any empirical evidence on this point, and it
seems fertile ground for further research. We turn now, however, to consider
empirical evidence on the general topic of the behavioral impact of financial
accounting.

III. EmpiricalEvidence on Accounting, Share Value, and
CorporateBehavior
The empirical evidence establishes that accounting standards and practices
matter. Accounting choices vary systematically between firms; corporations
make operational changes in response to adjustments in accounting rules, and
firms sacrifice cash flows to boost reported earnings. Unfortunately, the
empirical evidence does a poorer job of explaining why accounting matters.
Some of the evidence supports the detailed predictions of the share value
enhancing aspects of positive accounting theory, but much of the evidence is as
consistent with a manager-driven theory of accounting choice. None of this
evidence is inconsistent with the semi-strong view of the ECMH.
A. Stock PriceReaction to Changes in MandatoryAccounting Standards
The most obvious place to begin in a search for economic effects of
accounting is with changes in mandatory standards and market reaction to those
changes, and indeed, some studies have found stock price reactions to changes
in standards. For example, in 1990, the FASB implemented Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 106 (SFAS 106),76 which replaced pay-asyou-go accounting for post-retirement health care benefits with accrual
accounting. 77 This shift reduced reported earnings for companies offering such
benefits. One study of SFAS 106 implementation found that the release of the
exposure draft document formally proposing the standard change resulted in a

76. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS No. 106, EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN
PENSIONS (Dec. 1990) [hereinafter SFAS No. 106].

77.

Espahbodi et al., supra note 45, at 336-37.
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3% share price reduction for the firms in their sample.78 This result appears to
provide evidence for the contracting cost hypothesis and specifically the debt
of SFAS 106
Reduced earnings as a result
covenant hypothesis:
79
default.
costly
of
risk
the
increase
would
implementation
By contrast, a study of share price reaction to several key FASB
announcements pertaining to stock option expensing found no evidence of
systematic market reaction to these announcements. 80 Expensing of stock
options would reduce reported earnings and result in a stock price decrease if
the debt covenant effect were dominant. Thus, announcements signaling an
increasing/decreasing likelihood of expensing should have resulted in
reduced/increased share prices.
In their 1986 book on positive accounting theory, Watts and Zimmerman
report that studies investigating stock price reactions to mandated changes in
accounting procedures support the theory, but they admit that the associations
between variables are inconsistent across studies. 8' A more recent survey
reviewing twenty-six studies of mandated accounting changes published in the
top three accounting journals during the 1980s concluded that in aggregate
these studies provided little or no evidence of stock price effects. The author
concluded that the effects were small.82 It is also possible, however, that the
of
effects are significant but are often undetected because of the difficulty
83
isolating accounting change announcements that surprise the market.
78. Id. at 341. Sample firms offering post-retirement benefits experienced a 3% abnormal
negative return compared to a control group of firms not offering such benefits. Id. at 340 tbl.4.
The authors also found that the negative impact of the new standard on stock prices varied
cross-sectionally, as expected; the effect was more pronounced for firms that were at greater risk
of default as evidenced by high debt to equity ratios. Id. at 343.
79. Id. at 326. The authors also speculated that SFAS 106 may have increased contracting
costs generally, by making a poor tradeoff between timeliness and reliability of information
provided to the marketplace. Id. at 327. Accrual accounting is more timely than pay-as-you-go,
but accrual accounting involves estimation that was not necessary under the former standard.
80. Dechow et al., supra note 10, at 16. The events tested were the 1993 announcement
that the FASB had voted to mandate stock option expensing, the release of the exposure draft
mandating expensing about three months later, and the subsequent announcement that the FASB
would drop mandatory expensing in favor of voluntary expensing and mandatory footnoting.
Id. at 18 tbl.4. The study did find significant management reaction to the expensing proposal in
the form of comment letters to the SEC objecting to option expensing. Id. at 16.
81. WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supranote 13, at 311.
82. V.L. Bernard, CapitalMarkets Research in Accounting Duringthe 1980s: A Critical
Review, from the State ofAccounting Research as We Enter the 1990s, Bd. of Trustees of the
Univ. of Ill., Champaign (1989) (cited in Fields, supra note 22, at 264).
83. Leftwich, supranote 47, at 10. For this reason, Watts and Zimmerman note that stock
price change studies are relatively weak tests of positive accounting theory. Watts &
Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 138. If one accepts at least the semi-strong version of the
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It is worth noting, however, that there is no evidence that the
implementation of an accounting standard change impacts stock prices.
Researchers investigating SFAS 106 implementation, for example, generally
agree that the market had fully incorporated the change into stock prices prior
to implementation. 84 This evidence is consistent with semi-strong market
efficiency. Under a naive investor view of the market, stock prices should have
been reduced on the promulgation of earnings statements applying the new
standard.

B. CorporateResponse to Changes in Mandatory Accounting Standards
Given the difficulty of isolating share price responses to accounting
standard changes, some studies have focused, instead, on corporate reaction to
these changes. These studies reinforce the view that accounting matters and
provide limited support for the positive accounting theory explanation.
For example, SFAS 106, which engineered the switch from pay-as-you-go
accounting for post-retirement health care benefits to accrual accounting, had a
dramatic effect on firm behavior. Companies reacted to the new standard by
slashing post-retirement health care benefits. 85 One study of SFAS 106
implementation found a tight cluster of benefit cuts around the adoption date

ECMH, the actual reporting of higher or lower earnings as a result of a change in an accounting
standard that has no impact on the supply of publicly available information should have no
effect on stock prices. The market sees through this. The effect on firm value and stock price
arises from sticky contracts and the effect of a change in reported earnings on those contracts.
Once the market gets wind of a coming change in standards, however, the market can predict the
impact of that change on contracting costs in advance of its implementation. Holthausen &
Leftwich, supra note 39, at 105-06. Thus, assuming that a standard change is merely cosmetic,
the impact of the coming change should be fully incorporated in stock prices when the market
becomes confident that the change will be implemented. As a result, researchers looking for
evidence of market reaction to accounting changes focus on FASB exposure drafts or other
announcements of proposed changes. Id. at 105. But a price effect would be expected only
when the market is surprised. Accounting standard changes that are suggested, debated,
announced, revised, and re-announced may not result in the degree of surprise that would result
in a statistically significant stock price change even if the effect on contracting costs is
significant. Id. at 106.
84. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. EcON.
PERSP. 49, 66 (2003) (summarizing studies); see also H. Fred Mittelstaedt et al., SFAS No. 106
andBenefit Reductions in Employer-SponsoredRetiree Health CarePlans,70 ACCT. REv. 535,
538 (1995) (asking "why managers reduce[d] benefits as a result of SFAS No. 106 if security
prices fully reflect[ed] retiree health care liabilities prior to its adoption").
85. Mittelstaedt et al., supra note 84, at 548 tbl.2. See also id. at 554 (concluding that
89% of firms cut retiree health care benefits shortly after the adoption of SFAS 106).
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following ten years in which cuts were rare 86 and concluded that the "data
indicate a strong associative relation between the decision to cut retiree health
care benefits and the requirement to adopt SFAS No. 106.87
The authors of that study also found evidence supportive of the
contracting cost hypothesis. They found that cuts in benefits were related to the
extent to which a firm was leveraged prior to the adoption of SFAS 106 (a
proxy for the tightness of debt covenants) and the extent to which adoption
increased that leverage (which proxied for the increased risk of covenant
violation).88
However, as suggested above, some observers believe that the relationship
between the promulgation of SFAS 106 and benefit cuts is better explained as
political cover. 89 Accrual accounting for these benefits massively increased the
expense reported in company financial statements and allowed companies
slashing benefits to place the blame on the accountants. 90 Thus, it is difficult to
determine the relative contributions of contracting costs, political cover, and
managerial fixation with reported earnings towards the clear corporate
behavioral response to SFAS 106.
Similar results were found in an earlier study that investigated corporate
response to SFAS 13, which moved capital lease disclosures from financial
statement footnotes onto corporate balance sheets. 9' That move had the effect
of increasing debt and reducing reported income, which increased leverage and
decreased reported rates of return.92 From either a debt covenant or managerial
compensation perspective, this was an unwelcome change. Increased leverage
increased the risk of debt covenant default, and managerial compensation often
is tied, implicitly or explicitly, to accounting rates ofreturn. 93 Thus, the authors
86. Id. at 548 tbl.2.
87. Id. at 554. Of course, we need to be concerned about causation and potential omitted
variable problems. See Ray Ball, Discussionof Accountingfor Research and Development
Costs: The Impact on Research andDevelopment Expenditures, 18 J. Acr. RES. 27,37 (1980)
(warning that accounting change studies are suspect because they treat the imposition of a new
standard as exogenous, when in fact, the new standard, corporate reaction, and stock price
changes all may be related to an omitted environmental change).
88. Id. at 542-43.
89. Supra note 73 and accompanying text.
90. See Mittelstaedt et al., supranote 84, at 538-39 (reporting that employers testifying
before Congress blamed the cutting of retiree health care benefits in part on SFAS 106).
91. For a detailed discussion of the changes after SFAS No. 13, see Eugene A. Imhoff, Jr.
& Jacob K. Thomas, Economic ConsequencesofAccounting Standards: The Lease Disclosure
Rule Change, 10 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 277 (1988).
92. Id.at 279.
93. Id.at 279-81.
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predicted (and found) that firms would respond by reducing their reliance on
capital leases and shifting to operating leases that had better accounting
characteristics. 94 Although the authors demonstrated corporate sensitivity to the
negative accounting standard change, they did not test for the positive
accounting theory explanations.

C. Stock Option Expense Accounting
Of course, the highest profile change in accounting standards to occur in
some time was the adoption of mandatory stock option expensing, which came
into effect in 2005 and 2006. 9 Many experts predict that this change will
result in a significant adjustment in compensation practices. However, a study
of corporate lobbying against the rule's adoption indicates that opposition was
driven by management concerns unrelated to real economic effects. 96 But
before turning to this study, let us consider the behavioral effects of the
previous accounting regime.
Until 2005, standard compensatory stock options resulted in no reduction
in reported earnings at grant, exercise, or any other time, although the
compensation expense has been reported in footnotes to earnings statements
since 1995.97 Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that this anomalous
accounting treatment was a primary factor in the growing use of options in the
1990s. Less clear, however, is whether share value enhancing aspects of
positive accounting theory or self-serving managerial behavior better explains
the incentive effect of stock option accounting.
94. See id.
at 278 (finding the substitution of capital leases for operating leases to be the
most "pervasive effect" of SFAS No. 13).
95. Companies (other than small businesses) are required to record option compensation
as an expense in fiscal years beginning on or after June 15, 2005. 17 C.F.R. § 210.401(a)(3)(i)(A) (2007) (codifying Exchange Act Release No. 33-8568 (Apr. 21,2005)). Thus, a
company with a fiscal year beginning on June 1 would not have been required to report option

compensation as an expense until late in 2006.
96. See Dechow et al., supra note 10, at 16 (finding no evidence that lobbying was
motivated by the cost of capital or the cost of contracting).
97. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., OPINIONNo. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO
EMPLOYEES (1972), reprintedin OPINIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD 467,470-71
(1972) (establishing what became known as the "intrinsic value" method of accounting for
option compensation); SFAS No. 123, supra note 29, at para. 1-5 (encouraging adoption of"fair
value" accounting for stock options and requiring pro forma disclosure of expense by firms
continuing to apply APB 25); SFAS No. 123R, supra note 7, at para. 1-3 (mandating "fair
value" accounting for options); see also Judith E. Alden & Murray S. Akresh, Using Equity to
Compensate Executives, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supranote 55, at 67, 102-04 (describing
accounting rules for stock options).
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Practitioners and practice-oriented academics are uniformly of the view
that the accounting treatment of stock options is important to executives and
that the favorable treatment under pre-2005 GAAP contributed to the explosion
in their use. Kevin Murphy, a financial economist and noted executive
compensation expert, argues that the increased prevalence in the 1990s of
broad-based stock option plans granting a majority of options to employees
below the very top ranks is evidence of option overuse because only the top
executives are in position to significantly influence a firm's stock price. 98
Murphy attributes excessive use of options to management misperception that
options represented inexpensive compensation.9 9 That misperception was
based on the fact that options required no cash outlay (although that was also
true of stock compensation, which was far less popular) and on the fact that,
until recently, options did not reduce reported earnings.' 00 Murphy does not
believe that the accounting treatment of options had a direct effect on share
prices or that management fixation on compensation accounting was based
solely on share price effects.10' "[B]ased on countless discussions (often heated
arguments) with compensation consultants, practitioners, and executives,
fixation reflects more than the effect of
[Murphy is] convinced that.., this
02
accounting rules on stock prices.'0
Murphy believes that "companies ...respond... dramatically to changes
in the accounting treatment of stock options."' 10 3 As evidence, Murphy cites
data demonstrating that the practice of explicitly reducing the exercise prices of
outstanding stock options following market downturns came to an abrupt halt at
the end of 1998 when new accounting rules required firms to expense repriced
options. °4 Similarly, Brian Hall and Jeff Liebman echo the view of
practitioners that accounting treatment is an important factor in option plan
design. 10 5 They report that companies often fail to seriously consider stock

98. Murphy, supra note 9, at 857-58.
99. Id. at 859; see also Hall & Murphy, supra note 84, at 66 (arguing that the result of
underestimating the true cost of stock options "isthat too many options will be granted to too
many people, and options with favorable accounting treatment will be preferred to (perhaps
better) incentive plans with less favorable accounting").
100. Murphy, supra note 9, at 859-60.
101.

Id. at 860.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 861-62.
105. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation ofExecutive Compensation 6 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7596, 2000), available at http://ssrn.
conabstract=220848.
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option plans that had "bad accounting," i.e., result in compensation expense
recognition. 106
Although somewhat mixed, there is a growing body of empirical evidence
linking stock option use to its once-favorable accounting treatment. Because
the accounting treatment of conventional stock options was consistent up to
2005, cross-sectional analyses have been employed in seeking to establish a
relationship between option use and the 10degree
to which companies were
7
concerned with financial reporting results.
Of three studies focusing exclusively on option grants to CEOs, only one
found significant evidence that accounting drove option use. °8 However, two
studies of broad-based option plans both reached that conclusion. First, an
analysis of all options granted to employees by 123 firms over an eleven year
period found a positive relationship between the use of options and other
earnings management techniques and between option use and dividend
constraints.'0 9 And a more recent examination of option grants to executives
reported in the Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database yielded the conclusion
"that what was driving the use of options in non-CEO compensation [was] not
the need to realign incentives, but the desire to avoid the expense." 0
Although CEOs typically receive the largest option grants within their
companies, CEO options typically represent a small percentage of total options

106. Id.
107. As the studies discussed in the text and notes that follow exemplify, sensitivity to
reported earnings sometimes is estimated directly by looking at variables such as interest
coverage or retained earnings. Low interest coverage increases the probability of violating debt
covenants and limited retained earnings are likely to result in dividend constraints. These
variables are consistent with positive accounting theory and specifically the debt covenant
hypothesis. Other studies determine earnings sensitivity indirectly by looking for other
evidence of earnings management, such as how consistently a firm beats analyst earnings
forecasts. Although these latter studies tell us something about earnings sensitivity, they tell us
little about positive accounting theory. Earnings sensitivity in these cases could be driven by
self-serving managerial behavior rather than share value maximization.
108. Compare John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal
Equity Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 173 (1999) (finding a significant and
positive relationship between option use and dividend constraints), with David Yermack, Do
CorporationsAward CEO Stock OptionsEffectively?, 39 J.FIN. EcoN. 237,264 (1995) (finding
no significant relationship between option use and financial reporting costs), and Stephen Bryan
et al., CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An EmpiricalAnalysis on Incentive-Intensity,Relative
Mix, and EconomicDeterminants,73 J. Bus. 661,683 (2000) (finding evidence of a significant
link between options use and some measures of financial reporting costs, but not others).
109. Steven R. Matsunaga, The Effects of Financial Reporting Costs on the Use of
Employee Stock Options, 70 AcCT.REV. 1, 23 (1995).
110. Mary Ellen Carter et al., The Role of Accounting in the Design of CEO Equity
Compensation, 82 AcCT.REV. 327, 355 (2007).
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granted."' Accordingly, the earnings effect of CEO options alone would be
small in comparison to the effect of paying employees with options generally,
and it is not surprising that studies looking at broad-based option plans are
more informative.
Of course, the ultimate test of the impact of option accounting on option
use will be in the response of companies to the new option expensing
requirement. Already, there is evidence of a shift away from options in favor of
other forms of equity compensation, such as restricted stock, but it is too early
to draw firm conclusions.'12
The evidence suggests that the pre-2005 stock option accounting rules
served as a successful, although unintended, accounting incentive. The next
question is whether responsiveness to that incentive reflected contracting costs
and the shareholders' interest or was driven by managerial interests. Lawrence
Brown and Yen-Jung Lee provide evidence indicating the latter." 13 They find
an association between reduced use of options subsequent to the change in
accounting rules and improved operating performance."14 This evidence
suggests that the use of options under the prior accounting regime reduced
shareholder value."15
Moreover, there is an additional reason to suspect that self-serving
managerial behavior played an important role in the use of options under the
pre-2005 accounting regime. Managers may care excessively about reported
earnings generally, but even if they do not, they might prefer that stock options
not be expensed (and might over-rely on options given the pre-2005 accounting
treatment) because "footnoting" option compensation helped to camouflage
their own compensation.
111. See, e.g., Hall & Murphy, supra note 84, at 51 (finding that the value of options
granted to CEOs of S&P 500 firms averaged about 7% of the total value of options granted in
the mid-i 990s and fell to less than 5% from 2000 to 2002).
112. See Michael S. Knoll, Restricted Stock and the Section 83(b) Election: A Joint Tax
Perspective2 (U. Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 05-26, 2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-795544 (citing survey evidence indicating a shift from
stock options to restricted stock); Lawrence D. Brown & Yen-Jung Lee, The Impact of SFAS
123R on Changes in Option-Based Compensation 23, 33 (May 2007) (unpublished working
paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://ssm.
comi/abstract=930818 (finding that for a sample of about 750 firms, options represented 42% of
executive compensation pre-SFAS 123R but only 29% post-SFAS 123R). However, the
reduction in reliance on options may have been attributable to a number of factors, including the
fallout of recent corporate scandals, in addition to the change in accounting rules. Id.
113. See generally Brown & Lee, supranote 112 (analyzing changes in the composition of
executive compensation post-SFAS 123R).
114. See id. at 30 (describing the results of regression analysis).
115. Id. at 5.
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Two colleagues and I have argued that U.S. executive compensation
practices reflect, in large part, a managerial power view of corporate
governance." 6 Under this theory, executive compensation is not set by
efficient contracting, but is largely controlled by the managers, subject to
market forces and to investor and financial press outrage that tends to constrain
directors and the managers themselves. 1 7 Compensation transparency is the
manager's enemy according to this view, and compensation channels that are
less visible or camouflaged will be preferred." 8
There is some evidence that accounting camouflage plays a role in stock
option use. Although options are often granted far down into the employee
ranks, the value of options often is concentrated at the very top. One study
found evidence that corporate opposition to the 1993 FASB proposal to
mandate stock option expensing was driven by top executives' concerns
relating to the scrutiny of their compensation and not by real economic
effects." 9 Specifically, the study found that top executives of companies
submitting comment letters to the FASB opposing the change tended to receive
a greater fraction of their total pay through options and more pay in total than
executives of similar noncommenting firms. 120 In addition, it found that option
programs were more "top heavy" in commenting firms relative to their
This evidence suggests that the stock option
noncommenting peers. 12
accounting "incentive" may have been more effective than simple earnings
fixation would imply.
D. Voluntary Accounting Choice Evidence-Tax/EarningsTradeoffs
Every day, managers make choices between permissible accounting
techniques and make operational decisions that have significant accounting
consequences. The choice to employ stock options in lieu of other forms of
compensation provides one example of voluntary accounting choice writ large.
Studies of voluntary accounting choices demonstrate that accounting is not
irrelevant. This literature is voluminous. Instead of attempting to provide an
overview, I will direct the reader to any of several good survey articles noted in
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Bebchuk et al., supra note 61, at 846; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 61, at 61-79.
Bebchuk et al., supra note 61, at 786-88.
Id. at 789.
Dechow et al., supra note 10, at 2.
Id.

121. See id. (finding that, compared with their peers, commenting firms "use[d] options
relatively more intensively for top-executive compensation than for other employees").
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the margin, 122 and focus here, by way of example, on the literature examining
the tradeoff between minimizing taxes and boosting reported earnings.
This literature is typical of voluntary accounting choice studies. One
review study summed up the evidence as follows: "In short, the literature
suggests that financial accounting management and tax management are not
independent and neither consideration consistently dominates the other in
decision-making."'' 23 In other words, to a greater or lesser extent, managers
trade off taxes for earnings.
1. Discrete, One-Time Events
Although financial and tax accounting rules differ in many respects,
managers often face a conflict between minimizing taxes and maximizing
earnings. Actions that reduce taxable income and taxes often result in lower
financial statement income as well. If accounting were irrelevant, we would
expect managers to ignore reported earnings and minimize taxes in order to
maximize after-tax cash flow. Instead, we often see managers sacrificing cash
flow for reported earnings improvements. Many examples involve discrete,
one-time events.
The Kamin case, discussed above, is a prime example. There, recall, the
directors apparently forwent potential tax savings of $8 million to avoid a $26
million reduction in reported earnings. 124 The decision to distribute the
depreciated securities to the shareholders rather than sell them and distribute
the cash proceeds in Kamin apparently had no other consequence for
shareholders.
If the facts are taken as given in the opinion, the Kamin case squarely
presents a tradeoff between tax savings and earnings management.12 Although
122. See generally Fields et al., supra note 22; Douglas A. Shackelford & Terry Shevlin,
EmpiricalTax Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 321 (2001).
123. Shackelford & Shevlin, supra note 122, at 327.
124. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809-10 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
125. We should be careful not to read too much into this example. First, the case was
decided on a summary judgment motion made by the American Express defendants, which
required the judge to accept the facts as presented by the plaintiffs. Normally, we should be
highly suspicious of the facts presented in this circumstance. However, the opinion suggests
that the minutes of the relevant directors' meeting essentially confirmed the facts alleged by the
plaintiffs. Id. at 811. Second, this is a single isolated case. Nonetheless, practitioners generally
are not surprised by the action of the American Express board in this case and find it consistent
with their experience. See, e.g., Conversationsfrom the Warren Buffet Symposium (Lawrence
A. Cunningham, ed.), 19 CARDozo L. REv. 719, 794-800 (1997) (discussing Kamin and more
egregious examples of the phenomenon). Kamin is also consistent with empirical studies of
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somewhat less clean, two empirical studies of asset divestitures support the
view that managers sacrifice tax benefits and cash flow to boost earnings when
disposing of assets, but these studies provide only limited support for positive
accounting theory. One study investigated taxable sales versus nontaxable
spin-offs of corporate subsidiaries. 26 Just as the American Express directors
faced a choice between selling the depreciated securities and distributing them
to shareholders, directors of a company wishing to dispose of a subsidiary can
sell it or distribute its stock to shareholders through a nontaxable spin-off.127 If
managers focused solely on tax minimization, they would spin-off subsidiaries
if a sale would result in a taxable gain and sell subsidiaries if a sale would
result in a tax loss. Instead, this study demonstrated that managers routinely
incurred avoidable
tax costs or forwent potential tax benefits in structuring
28
divestments.1
Of course, there could be many reasons other than tax and financial
reporting considerations for structuring a divestment as a sale or spin-off-a
sale generates cash, while a spin-off does not; a sale may yield a premium price
if the asset is worth more in the hands of the buyer. 2 9 Nonetheless, the
evidence was consistent with the view that managers trade off tax against
earnings, and the authors estimated that firms were willing to incur $0.19 of
extra tax costs to boost earnings by $1.00.130 This study provided little
evidence of positive accounting theory. The results were only "weakly
consistent" with contracting cost variables. 3'
Another study of major asset divestitures confirms that managers weigh
both taxes and the impact on reported income in making divestitures.132 This
study found that firms with greater inside ownership concentration were less
likely to sacrifice tax benefits in an effort to boost reported earnings.133 The
author suggested that high inside ownership concentration reduces capital
asset divestitures, as discussed below. Infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
126. Edward L. Maydew et al., The Impact of Taxes on the Choice ofDivestiture Method,
28 J. AcCT. & ECON. 117 (1999).
127. In a properly designed spin-off transaction, the parent company recognizes no gain or
loss and shareholders face no immediate tax consequences; rather, a shareholder's basis in
parent stock is reallocated between the stock received in the spin-off firm and the stock
maintained in the now smaller parent firm. Id. at 121.
128. Id. at 120.
129. Id.
at 119-20.
130. Id. at 146.
131. Id. at 138.
132. Kenneth J. Klassen, The Impact of Inside Ownership Concentrationon the Trade-Off
Between Financialand Tax Reporting, 72 ACCT. REv. 455 (1997).
133. Id. at472.
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market pressures on a firm.' 13 4 That may be so, but it is unclear how this
reduced capital market pressure fits into positive accounting theory. That
theory holds that shareholders are sensitive to earnings because of sticky
contracts based on those earnings.
Perhaps high inside ownership
concentration reduces the cost of renegotiating executive compensation
contracts, but it is unclear what effect inside ownership would have on debt
covenants. It seems much more plausible that firms with high inside ownership
focus more on after-tax cash flow because manager and shareholder interests
are more closely aligned. This evidence supports the view that the appetite for
earnings found in many of these studies is driven by managerial preferences
rather than or in addition to shareholder preferences.
2. OngoingActivities
Kamin and the asset disposition studies certainly demonstrate management
sensitivity to reported earnings. But these cases involve major, one-time
events. One may question whether earnings effects influence corporate
behavior with respect to more mundane day-to-day operational or accounting
decisions. Apparently they do, but perhaps less consistently or to a lesser
extent. Again, rather than reviewing a large sample of studies, I will focus on
two examples35and leave the interested reader to peruse the review studies cited
in the notes.1
The first example involves disqualification of incentive stock options
(ISOs). The ISO disqualification evidence is consistent with what we have
seen before-accounting matters-but the evidence does not clearly distinguish
between share value enhancing and manager-driven explanations of accounting
relevance.
Compared with nonqualified stock options, ISOs provide tax benefits for
optionees, but result in tax costs for issuers. "6 In some cases, depending on
various tax rates and the amount of appreciation in the stock underlying the
ISO, it makes economic sense for companies and employees to agree to arrange
dispositions that will disqualify options for ISO treatment.1 37 At times, the tax
benefit to a company from disqualification is more than sufficient to reimburse
134.
135.

Id.
In addition to Shackelford & Shevlin, supranote 122, useful reviews of this literature

can be found in MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING
APPROACH (2d ed. 2002), Fields et al., supranote 22, and Maydew et al., supra note 126.

136.
137.

SCHOLESETAL., supra note 135, at 191-92.
Id. at 196-97.
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an employee for her additional tax cost. This reimbursement, 38however, must be
recognized as an expense, which reduces reported income.'
Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores investigated ISO exercise and
disqualification by 170 companies between 1982 and 1991 and estimated
whether disqualification would have resulted in a net tax benefit for the
companies and their employees.139 The authors determined that in over half of
the cases in which there was a net tax benefit, firms failed to disqualify
options. 40 The authors concluded that firms trade off tax benefits against
reported earnings.' 14 Cross-sectional analysis of firms that did and did not
disqualify ISOs yielded some evidence supporting positive accounting theory.
The net tax benefit tended to be larger when options were disqualified; and
nondisqualifying firms tended to be more highly leveraged, and thus would
142
have faced higher debt covenant costs had they disqualified their ISOs.
The second example of tradeoffs between taxes and earnings in day-to-day
operations involves inventory accounting. Under current tax rules, companies
may value inventory under either a "first in, first out" (FIFO) approach, in
which case the value of inventory tends to approximate current costs, or a "lastin, first-out" (LIFO) approach, in which case historic inventory values tend to
persist. 143 However, companies electing to use the LIFO approach for tax
purposes are required to use the same approach to valuing inventories in
preparing the accounts presented to investors.44 In a period of rising prices,
145
LIFO inventory valuation results in less taxable income than FIFO valuation.
138. Id. at 197.
139. Steve Matsunaga et al., DisqualifyingDispositionsof Incentive Stock Options: Tax
Benefits Versus FinancialReporting Costs, 30 J. ACCT. RES. 37, 50-52 (1992).
140. Id. at 63 tbl.6.
141. Id. at 66.
142. Id. at 63 tbl.6.
143. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.472-1 (2007) (allowing for election of the LIFO accounting method
for inventories).
144. I.R.C. § 472(c) (Supp. IV 2005).
145. In determining taxable income, businesses that buy and sell inventory first calculate
gross profit as follows:
Gross Profit = Receipts - Cost of Goods Sold (COGS)
COGS = Value of Opening Inventory + Inventory Purchased - Value of Closing

Inventory
Compared with FIFO, LIFO results in reduced gross profit and taxable income during
inflationary periods because LIFO results in a relatively lower closing inventory valuation and a
relatively greater cost of goods sold. See I.R.C. §§ 471, 472 (providing the statutory
requirements for LIFO inventory accounting);

MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 750-54 (5th ed. 2005) (explaining the

effect of inventory valuation methodology on taxes and earnings).
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But LIFO valuation also results in reduced reported earnings in inflationary
times. Thus, firms face a tradeoff between minimizing taxes and maximizing
46
reported earnings when they choose between LIFO and FIFO accounting. 1
Conventional wisdom has held that firms often failed to adopt LIFO,
leaving potential tax savings on the table, because they preferred the financial
accounting effects of FIFO. 147 Two studies produced in the late 1980s and
early 1990s found that tax savings were an important factor in firms'
LIFO/FIFO decisions, but they did not show that earnings preferences were
unimportant. Examining a sample of large publicly traded firms consistently
using LIFO or FIFO as their primary inventory method between 1962 and
1981, Dopuch and Pincus found that the median LIFO firm saved $942,000 per
year as a result of using LIFO and that the median FIFO firm sacrificed
$160,000 per year as a result of its failure to adopt LIFO. 14 8 The authors
concluded that this data was consistent with a tax motivation for adopting
LIFO, suggesting that the tax savings forgone by FIFO firms were too small to
justify the administrative costs of switching. 149 Although that conclusion is
plausible and supports the idea the firms grow into LIFO,' 50 it is also possible
that a significant number of the FIFO firms would have switched to LIFO
absent the adverse effect on earnings.
A 1992 study by Cushing and LeClere included survey evidence on firm
motivation in choosing LIFO or FIFO. 151 With respect to 27% of the FIFO
firms responding, the authors "could not identify any convincing explanation
for the continuing use of FIFO. 1 52 In a response that undermines Dopuch and
146. Companies adopting LIFO inventory accounting (in full or in part) for purposes of
computing their primary earnings figures can include in the footnotes to their financial reports
pro forma earnings calculations utilizing FIFO accounting. Kleinbard, Plesko, and Goodman
argue that this option is widely employed and renders book-tax inventory accounting conformity
illusory. Edward D. Kleinbard et al., Is it Time to Liquidate LIFO?, 113 TAX NOTES 237,
(2006). But if the distinction between primary and pro forma earnings figures were
unimportant, it is doubtful that managers would have resisted the FASB's efforts to move stock
option expense from footnote to primary earnings statement. Of course, specific differences
between inventory and stock option compensation accounting could exist that explain this
apparent paradox.
147. See DEPT. OF TREAS., TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 111 (1984) (noting that roughly 95% of firms with inventories used FIFO accounting).

148. Nicholas Dopuch & Morton Pincus, Evidence on the Choice ofInventoryAccounting
Methods: LIFO Versus FIFO,26 J. AcCT.Rs. 28, 36-37 (1988).
149. Id. at 37.
150. In the authors' sample, the median FIFO firm was about one-tenth the size of the
median LIFO firm. Id.at 36.
151. Barry E. Cushing & Marc J. LeClere, Evidence on the Determinants of Inventory
Accounting Policy Choice, 67 ACCT. REv. 355 (1992).
152. Id.at364.

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

963

Pincus' inference from their study, only 6% of FIFO users reported that LIFO
bookkeeping costs were the most important reason
they used FIFO and 44%
5 3
irrelevant.
or
unimportant
as
factor
this
rated
Moreover, in arguing for the repeal of the LIFO tax option, Kleinbard,
Plesko, and Goodman have recently shown that LIFO use peaked in the early
1980s and is quite rare today. 5 4 They found that fewer than 10% of U.S.
public companies with inventories reported having a LIFO reserve in 2005 and
that less than 2% of firms used LIFO exclusively. 155 Further, they found that
LIFO use was highly concentrated, with thirteen companies accounting for 50%
of LIFO reserves and fifty-six companies accounting for 80% of LIFO reserves
in 2004.156
Of course, this data does not tell us that the remaining firms with
inventories are sacrificing significant tax benefits by forsaking LIFO.
Certainly, the inflationary driving force for LIFO adoption has been modest in
recent years. On the other hand, one would suspect that bookkeeping costs per
revenue dollar have fallen since the 1970s and 1980s as a result of automation.
The LIFO/FIFO evidence does not establish that firms ignore earnings in
selecting an inventory methodology. Moreover, the fact that tax appears to be
an important consideration in the choice of inventory methodology is not
inconsistent with the view that firms tradeoff taxes for earnings. That view
does not suggest that firms ignore taxes, only that the earnings considerations
result in less tax minimization than would occur in their absence. However,
this evidence might suggest that firms do a better job of ignoring earnings and
maximizing cash flows with respect to decisions with continuing impact, such

153. Id. at 363 tbl.4.
154. Kleinbard et al., supra note 146, at 249.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 251. Combining the Kleinbard, Plesko, and Goodman data with that provided
in a recent Wall Street Journal article allows one to estimate that Exxon Mobil Corporation
alone accounts for about 20% of recent LIFO reserves of U.S. public companies. See id. at 238
(stating that the total LIFO reserves in 2005 were almost $70 billion); David Reilly, Big Oil's
Accounting Methods Fuel Criticism, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2006, at C1 (reporting that Exxon's

LIFO reserves in 2005 were $15.4 billion). U.S. oil companies generally use LIFO inventory
accounting. Id. at CI. For these companies, LIFO may provide advantages for both tax and
earnings purposes. The profits of the oil majors are very sensitive to world oil prices. When
crude oil prices rise, gasoline pump prices rise, as do the profits of the oil majors, inevitably
leading to price gouging investigations and calls for the imposition of windfall profits taxes on
the oil companies. The negative political costs of high reported earnings arising from oil price
jumps may outweigh other contracting costs as well as the oil executives' general preferences
for high reported earnings. By holding down both reported earnings and taxable income in a
period of rising oil prices, LIFO may be unambiguously positive for the oil majors.
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as choice of inventory methodology, than discrete, one-time events, such as
asset dispositions.
3. Taxes Paidon FraudulentEarnings
As a final egregious example of companies sacrificing taxes for earnings,
consider a recent study of firms that restated financial statements between 1996
and 2002 as a result of SEC accusations of accounting fraud. 15 7 This study
found that the mean firm paid $11.85 million in taxes on the phantom earnings,
or about $0.11 for each dollar of inflated earnings.1 58 One hopes these results
are not typical. Managers who are willing to commit fraud to inflate earnings
probably are less concerned about shareholder value than honest managers.
Nonetheless, the study emphasizes the obsession of some managers with
reported earnings.
E. Survey Evidence Concerningthe Effects ofAccounting on
CorporateBehavior
John Graham, Campbell Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal have recently
surveyed more than four hundred financial executives and conducted in-depth
interviews with twenty more in an attempt to better understand the role and
importance of corporate financial reporting. 59 They found that CFOs are
extremely concerned, perhaps obsessed, with meeting stock analysts' consensus
earnings forecasts.160 Over half of the respondents indicated that they would be
willing to sacrifice cash flow if necessary to achieve earnings targets. 16
Interestingly, the respondents appeared more willing to adjust operations to
achieve earnings targets than to make permissible adjustments to their
accounting practices.16 2 Respondents thought that sacrificing cash flow for

157. Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will Firms Payfor Earnings That Do Not Exist?:
Evidence of Taxes Paidon Allegedly FraudulentEarnings,79 ACCT. REv. 387 (2004).
158. Id. at 389.
159. See generally Graham et al., supranote 38.
160. Id. at 9-10. This finding is consistent with S.P. Kothari's 2001 assessment that "the
evidence is fairly strong that managerial behavior is consistent with the market behaving as if it
is functionally fixated on reported accounting numbers, but that the security price behavior itself
is at worst only modestly consistent with functional fixation." Kothari, supranote 22, at 197.
161. Graham et al., supranote 38, at 15-16.
162. Id. at 16.
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effect of missed
earnings was unfortunate, but appropriate, given the adverse
63
earnings targets on stock prices and market confidence.1
While the study confirms management fixation with earnings, it provides
little evidence supportive of positive accounting theory. Less than 30% of
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "meeting earnings
benchmarks helps us avoid violating debt-covenants."' 64 Moreover, CFOs
downplayed the impact of hitting earnings targets on their own short-term
compensation (no surprise), but interviews revealed that longer term career
concerns motivate managers to "make their numbers.' 65 Although CFOs
report that their interests and those of shareholders are aligned in this respect, a
focus on career concerns could reflect agency problems. Particularly troubling
was the fact that the CFOs assigned an average probability ofjust over 50% to
the likelihood that their firms would pursue a positive net present value project
that reduced quarterly earnings by $0.10 per share (about 7%) even if their
firms would not achieve the consensus earnings target by forgoing the
project.166 One is forced to wonder whether managers are more concerned
about the incremental damage to share price of missing an earnings target by a
greater margin or the incremental embarrassment and personal taint.

IV. Does Accounting Matter? Synthesis of the Theory andEvidence
There can be little doubt that accounting matters. There is abundant
evidence that managers are sensitive to reported earnings and sacrifice cash
flow, as in Kamin, to boost earnings, and that changes in mandatory accounting
standards affect corporate behavior. However, evidence of systematic variation
in discretionary accounting choices and in corporate responses to mandatory
accounting standard changes consistent with share value enhancing aspects of
positive accounting theory is mixed. For example, a recent survey article
concluded that the data suggest a relationship between debt and accounting but
that the empirical results are inconclusive, and thus, "we cannot draw definitive
inferences."' 167 Given the weakness of the stock price reaction studies, it is
plausible, perhaps likely, that accounting choice, lobbying against earningsreducing standard changes, and reaction to mandatory standard changes reflects

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at2.
Id. at tbl.4.
Id. at 13.
Id. at tbl.7.
Fields et al., supra note 22, at 275.
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self-serving management behavior and agency costs as much as or more than
the concern with share value maximization.
This Part will take one last look at Kamin and managerial resistance to
stock option expensing in light of the theory and evidence discussed in the
previous two Parts. The stock option expensing saga leads one to question
whether and why the effect of accounting rules on corporate behavior is
persistent. As suggested in the previous Part, one might find management
resistance to absorbing a large one-time earnings hit unsurprising, but expect
that, with respect to ongoing activities, firms and markets would adjust to
changes in accounting rules over time, rendering most behavioral effects shortlived. But if so, why would managers fight so hard to avoid stock option
expensing? The last section of this Part will consider the persistence question
more generally before we take up the issue of book-tax conformity in the next
Part.
A. Kamin v. American Express
The American Express directors' justification for distributing the
depreciated DLJ shares, as reflected in the board minutes and reported by the
judge in Kamin, was that a $26 million "reduction of net income would have a
serious effect on the market value of the publicly traded American Express
stock."' 168 That seems highly unlikely. First, as discussed above, even if one is
skeptical of the efficiency of U.S. stock markets, it is very hard to imagine that,
in this case, the market had not already adjusted American Express's stock
price to reflect the unrealized loss on such a large, discrete, publicized
investment.169 Direct price effects are improbable.
Second, it is difficult to believe that contracting costs related to debt
covenants drove the decision to distribute the securities and forgo the tax
benefit. Apparently, this was an isolated incident, reducing the benefit of
renegotiation, but, on the other hand, renegotiation for a one-time event would
have been relatively simple. For distribution of the depreciated shares to have
been a rational decision in accordance with the debt covenant hypothesis, one
would have to conclude that a one-time $26 million earnings hit increased the
expected cost of technical debt default by $8 million and that renegotiating debt
covenants to account for this charge to earnings would have cost $8 million or
168.

Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. 1976).

169.

Even Lynn Stout, who is skeptical of the informational efficiency of markets, admits

that "[i]nformation that is easy to understand and that is trumpeted in the business media...
may be incorporated into market prices almost instantaneously." Stout, supra note 23, at 656.
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more. Moreover, the political cost story runs counter to the directors' decision.
According to Watts and Zimmerman, companies 1prefer
to report lower earnings
70
to stave off tax increases or other political costs.
That leaves us with employment contract effects. Reported earnings
apparently factored into the compensation of some of the inside directors (and
presumably other employees). If these agreements are sticky, reducing reported
earnings could have costs (lower productivity) and benefits (lower
compensation paid), but in all likelihood, the net compensation effect of
reduced reported earnings would have been positive for shareholders. In any
event, it seems highly unlikely that the share value impact resulting from the
one-time charge against earnings could have approached $8 million.
It is much more likely that Kamin is a case of managerial preferences for
earnings exceeding shareholder preferences and managers acting on their
preferences-in other words, a classic agency problem. It would be nice to be
able to say (as I have done in my corporate law class for several years) that the
directors' decision in Kamin was unambiguously against shareholder interests,
but we cannot honestly say that, given our current understanding of accounting
theory. However, the burden should have been on the directors to explain how
the indirect effects of a one-time earnings hit could offset the forgone tax
benefits. Rather than relying on a general statement about the "serious" market
effects of a reduction in net income, the onus should have been on the directors
and their experts to explain why an accounting-driven reduction in earnings
would have a serious effect. Was the company very highly leveraged? Would
the earnings reduction have triggered technical default? Was renegotiation of
debt covenants or other alternatives to forgoing the tax benefit considered?
What were the costs of these alternatives? If management is unable to provide
a cost/benefit analysis at least plausibly justifying a decision to sacrifice tax
benefits for earnings, that decision should not be protected from judicial
17
scrutiny under the prevailing corporate law standard.
170. WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supranote 13, at 223; Ross L. Watts &Jerold L. Zimmerman,
Towards a Positive Theory ofthe DeterminationofAccounting Standards,53 AcCT. REV. 112,
115 (1978).
171. Unfortunately, the legal burden on directors in cases like Kamin is minimal. In most
U.S. jurisdictions, unless there is clear self-dealing, courts defer to the rationalbusiness
judgment of the directors. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-25 (1986).
However, in order to earn the protection of the "business judgment rule," the directors must
demonstrate, inter alia, that they were reasonably informed with respect to the matter.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (2005). The shareholders' argument in a
future case like Kamin should be that directors who rely on unsupported assertions that purely

accounting-driven earnings reductions impair share value have not earned the protection of the
business judgment rule because they have not made themselves reasonably informed in light of
the theory and evidence. However, given the resistance of courts to second guess managerial
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B. ManagerialOpposition to Stock Option Expensing
Similarly, managerial opposition to stock option expensing cannot be
dismissed out of hand as antagonistic to shareholder interests given our current
knowledge of accounting theory. We can be fairly certain that moving fully
disclosed stock option expense from the footnotes to the income statement will
not have a direct effect on stock prices, but the change surely will involve some
contracting costs. If the debt covenant costs associated with this earningsreducing change exceed the political and employment cost savings, some
reduction in share prices should be expected. And, unlike the Kamin situation,
there is no tax or other direct financial benefit associated with the accounting
change to offset the increased contracting costs. 172 So, at one level, managerial
opposition to the change seems rational.
However, there are reasons to suspect that managerial opposition to option
expensing resulted from more than the indirect effect of the standard change on
share value. First, although the standard change presumably would be
permanent, debt and compensation agreements are not. Although deviating
from GAAP has costs, new debt agreements and employment contracts could
be based on earnings excluding option compensation expense if the parties
believe that this measure better serves their purposes. The evidence from one
study indicates that parties to debt contracts increasingly are deviating from
rolling GAAP when specifying debt covenants.173 Thus, the debt contracting
costs associated with the change are limited to the impact on existing
agreements and the cost of deviating from GAAP going forward, which
presumably are modest.
Second, as in Kamin, political and employment effects associated with the
change presumably would be positive and offset the other contracting costs to
decisions and additional statutory protections for managers, particularly in Delaware, the
prospects for such an argument are not good. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
907 A.2d 693, 697, 760 (Del. Ch. 2005) (finding that although "many aspects of defendants'
conduct... fell significantly short of the best practices of ideal corporate governance," the
Disney directors were at most "ordinarily negligent" and thus they were insulated from liability
in accordance with the business judgment rule); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2006) (permitting Delaware companies to include in their charters exculpatory "provision[s]
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders
for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director," with exceptions for, inter alia,
breaches of the duty of loyalty and "acts or omissions not in good faith").
172. This is not to say that there is no benefit to shareholders from rationalizing
compensation accounting. Assuming that managers are utilizing options excessively because of
their favorable accounting treatment, a level playing field should result in a more efficient mix
of compensation.
173.

Mohrman, supra note 52, at 82-83.
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some extent. Third, we should not forget the evidence that managerial
opposition to the 1993 option expensing proposal reflected concerns with
increased management pay exposure rather than contracting costs. Once again,
agency costs likely best explain managerial resistance to options expensing.
C. Are EarningsEffects Persistent?
Juxtaposition of Kamin and the evidence of managerial resistance to stock
option expensing leads one to question whether the behavioral effects of
accounting are persistent, and if so, why? With respect to ongoing activities,
one would imagine that firms would eventually contract around inefficient
GAAP rules, and we have seen evidence that parties to debt contracts
increasingly do. 174 However, historical stock option practice suggests that
accounting rules can have persistent effects. Now that the accounting
preference for stock options has been eliminated, it appears that the use of
options may be declining, but while the preference existed, reliance on option
compensation increased steadily. Firms and markets did not contract around
the accounting preference for options; they embraced it. 175 Moving beyond the

realm of options, recall that corporations responded to the imposition of accrual
accounting for post-retirement health care benefits by permanently reducing
those benefits, not by adjusting their debt and compensation contracts, 176 and
that some firms have consistently failed to disqualify incentive stock options in
the face of tax benefits. 177 On the other hand, there is some evidence
suggesting that tax benefits dominate earnings effects in firms' inventory
accounting choices, which supports the idea that firms and markets adjust
rationally to maximize after-tax cash flow over the long haul. However, as
noted above, even here, we cannot be sure that some FIFO firms have not left
tax benefits on the table as a result of earnings concerns.
Possibly, the examples suggesting persistence are anomalies, and
companies typically do adjust. However, given this evidence, it is worth
pondering why firms might alter behavior rather than adjust debt covenants and
compensation contracts to neutralize the effect of unfavorable accounting
rules. 178
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
earnings

Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
One possibility is that the stock market is not semi-strong efficient. Perhaps reported
affect share prices because of the cost and difficulty of incorporating this information.
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As discussed above, the debt covenant hypothesis provides little help in
explaining persistent behavioral effects of accounting rules because covenants
could be based on a combination of GAAP and non-GAAP rules, or
anticipating potential rule changes, the parties could elect to base covenants on
the GAAP rules in force at the time the covenants are entered into. 179 Thus,
while it is costly to specify and maintain non-GAAP books, this effect is
unlikely to contribute significantly to the persistence of corporate behavioral
response to changes in GAAP.
However, agency theory could help explain the persistence of accounting
effects, as the following examples demonstrate. First, suppose a manager's
contract includes an earnings-based bonus. Under the pre-2005 accounting
rules for options, the manager could increase earnings, and unless her
compensation scheme was adjusted, increase her bonus by paying her
subordinates with options instead of cash.180 If the company's compensation
committee negotiated executive pay at arm's length and had all of the
information that the manager had, it would not allow her to profit from this
artificial earnings increase. But monitoring executive compensation is costly
and imperfect.18 1 Moreover, the managerial power view of executive
compensation suggests that managers have significant control over the
compensation setting process, that executive pay negotiation often is not at
arm's length, and that the ultimate cap on compensation may be unfavorable
exposure and outrage. 182 Thus, while it may be more efficient for the company
to pay its rank-and-file employees with cash and pay the manager a larger
bonus, the artificially higher reported earnings and management bonuses
associated with broad-based option compensation have the advantage of

For example, footnoted information may be deemed to be less reliable and authoritative than
information provided in the body of audited financial statements. Supra note 30 and
accompanying text. As argued above, this explanation seems unpersuasive as long as a choice
between competing accounting rules has no materialaffect on publicly available information,
but unexplained anomalies that challenge even the semi-strong version of the ECMH do exist.
Supra Part II.A.
179. Mohrman, supra note 52, at 78-79.
180. Cash compensation results in a dollar for dollar reduction in earnings. Under the pre2005 accounting rules, properly designed options resulted in no reduction in earnings at grant,
exercise, or any other time. Supra note 97 and accompanying text.
181. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 63, at 305-60 (describing the
managerial agency problem). For additional discussion of the challenges of controlling
managerial compensation under various theories of corporate governance, see David I.Walker,
The Manager'sShare, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 587 (2005).
182. Bebchuketal., supra note 61, at 783-95. See also BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 61,
at 61-79 (providing an overview of various features of the managerial power model).
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subtlety. It would1 83
not be surprising for the manager and, indeed, the directors to
prefer this option.
Second, suppose an executive believes that her reputation as a manager and
future career prospects depend on her ability to consistently meet or exceed
consensus earnings forecasts. Faced with an earnings-decreasing change in
accounting rules that may not have been fully appreciated by analysts, such as the
promulgation of SFAS 106, the manager may be tempted to make irrevocable
operational choices, e.g., slashing post-retirement health care benefits, that restore
earnings rather than attempting to explain away the adverse results to analysts.1 84
Similarly, an executive may decide against adopting a proposed operational change
that carries adverse accounting consequences, such as shifting away from option
compensation under the pre-2005 rules, given concerns over the move's impact on
the firm's ability to achieve earnings targets in the current period or some future
period. These effects could well be persistent, particularly if a firm's competitors
can be expected to make earnings-enhancing choices.
It could well be the case that potential earnings effects exert greater influence
over discrete decisions, such as the choice between selling and spinning off a
significant asset, than over ongoing activities, such as the choice of inventory
accounting methodology. However, as we have seen, even with respect to ongoing
activities, there is both evidence and theory supporting the idea that the behavioral
effects of accounting are persistent.

V Book-Tax Conformity
U.S. public companies maintain separate tax and financial accounts, prepared
under different rules and producing different results. The administrative cost of
maintaining multiple sets of books has long been recognized, but justified as
necessary, given the differing purposes of and audiences for tax and financial
reports.185 In recent years, however, the focus has been on the growing gap between
183. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 61, at 786-89 (arguing that directors are sensitive to
investor outrage over executive compensation and prefer pay packages that deflect outrage).
184.

Almost 60% of CFOs surveyed by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal agreed or strongly

agreed that one reason their firms emphasized achieving earnings targets was that missing the
targets required management to spend a lot of time explaining the miss to analysts rather than
discussing future prospects. Graham et al., supranote 38, at tbl.5.
185. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979) (discussing differing
goals of and audiences for financial and tax accounting); see also Daniel Shaviro, The Optimal
Relationship Between Taxable Income and FinancialAccounting Income: Analysis and a
Proposal5 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-38, 2007),

available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017073 (arguing that absent managerial and political
agency problems, optimal tax and accounting income "measures would diverge significantly"
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earnings reported to investors (relatively high) and income reported to the taxing
authorities (relatively low) and suspicion that part of this gap represents
inappropriate tax avoidance and/or earnings inflation. 86 Of course, part ofthe gap
flows from explicit tax incentives, such as accelerated tax depreciation, or from
recognized financial accounting anomalies, such as the failure until recently to
record compensatory stock options as an expense. It is widely believed, however,
that these deviations represent only part of the gap.' 87 Reformers argue that tax
shelters and earnings inflation schemes tend to rely on discontinuities between book
and tax accounting. Companies seek out techniques that will allow them to report
less taxable income without reducing reported earnings, and they prefer earnings
enhancement schemes that do not result in increased taxable income.'8 8 Eliminating
discontinuities, some argue, would tend to discourage these activities.189 In a world
of full conformity between financial and tax accounting rules, companies could not
inflate earnings without paying additional taxes and could not cut taxes without
cutting earnings as well.
Of course, no one suggests that even full book-tax conformity would be a
panacea. Even faced with a tradeoff, finns may inappropriately shelter income from
tax or inflate earnings. In Kamin, the book and tax treatment of the disposition of
the shares were in conformity. American Express faced a tradeoff between
minimizing taxes and maximizing reported earnings, and chose the latter. Of
course, Kamin did not involve accounting fraud or tax sheltering, but the suggestion
is that without the counterweight provided by conforming book and tax accounting
treatments, companies are more likely to stretch the rules in seeking to maximize
earnings and minimize tax.

but advocating book-tax conformity as a means of combating those agency problems).
186. See Lillian F. Mills & George A. Plesko, Bridging the Reporting Gap: A Proposal
for More Informative ReconcilingofBook and Tax Income, 56 NAT. TAX J. 865, 867-68 (2003)
(providing data on the increasing ratio of book income to taxable income between the early
1970s and late 1990s and citing other evidence of an increasing gap in the 1990s); Hanlon &
Shevlin, supra note 12, at 2 (noting the increasing divergence between book and tax income and
expressing concern that the difference may be a result of misleading or fraudulent reporting);
George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do Large Public CorporationsPay?: Estimatingthe Effective
Tax Rates of the S&P 500, 89 VA. L. REv. 1793, 1798 (2003) (confirming conclusions of
previous studies finding an increased gap between book and taxable income in the late 1990s).
187. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai, The Divergence Between Book Income and Tax Income, in
17 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 169, 169-201 (James M. Poterba ed., 2003) (arguing that
differences arising from the disparate treatment of depreciation, stock options, and foreign
source income do not explain the entire book-tax difference and suggesting tax sheltering as the
likely explanation for the residual difference).
188. Yin, supra note 11, at 225.
189. Id.
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The pros and cons of increased book-tax conformity have been widely
debated. 90 However, the behavioral impact of accounting standards has not been
fully considered by the participants in this debate.' 9' This Part argues that the
behavioral effects would be largely negative. Many of the existing gaps between tax
and financial accounting rules, such as depreciation rules that allow companies to
report higher earnings to investors than the IRS, can be thought of as tax incentives,
accounting incentives, or both. However increased book-tax conformity is
achieved, the result will be erosion of these incentives. The potential adverse
economic effects represent an unappreciated cost of book-tax conformity and
provide reason to prefer the alternative of increased disclosure and reconciliation
between financial and tax accounts.
A. Book-Tax Conformity Proposals
Book-tax conformity could be advanced in many ways. Full conformity could
be achieved by assessing corporate taxes on income reported under GAAP or by
requiring that financial accounts be prepared consistent with the Internal Revenue
Code. Both financial and tax accounting could be based on a compromise set of
rules between the current tax code and GAAP. Other options include using one of
the foregoing as a baseline for both tax and financial reporting but providing for

190. Scholarly articles proposing or supporting some form of increased book-tax
conformity include Desai, supra note 11; Mitchell L. Engler, Corporate Tax Shelters and
Narrowing the Book/Tax "GAAP," 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 539 (2001); Celia Whitaker,
Bridging the Book-Tax Accounting Gap, 115 YALE L.J. 680 (2005); Yin, supra note 11; and
Shaviro, supra note 185. Calls for increased conformity in the popular press are common as
well. See, e.g., Alan Murray, Narrowing Tax GapShould Be PriorityofNext Congress,WALL
ST. J., Oct. 8, 2002, at A4 (arguing that Congress should act to increase reporting conformity).
Articles criticizing or questioning increased conformity include Johnson, supra note 12; Terry
Shevlin, Corporate Tax Shelters and Book-Tax Differences, 55 TAx L. REv. 427 (2002);
Michelle Hanlon et al., Evidence on the Possible Information Loss of Conforming Book Income
and Taxable Income (Jan. 12, 2007) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=-686402; Hanlon & Shevlin, supra
note 12. Other useful articles examining book-tax conformity include Desai, supra note 187,
and Wolfgang Schon, Lecture, The Odd Couple: A Common Futurefor Financialand Tax
Accounting, 58 TAx L. REV. 111, 115-16 (2005).
191. In a recent paper, Doug Shackelford, Joel Slemrod, and James Sallee model the effect
of tax and accounting on the real decisions of firms and suggest that book-tax conformity would
affect these decisions as well as the level of income reported for tax and financial accounting
purposes. Douglas A. Shackelford et al., A Unifying Model of How the Tax System and
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Affect Corporate Behavior 38 (Jan. 12, 2007)
(unpublished working paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), availableat
http://ssm.com/abstract=-223729. One of their insights is that activities that create flexibility for
financial reporting will be favored. Id. at 39.

64 WASH. & LEE L. REV 927 (2007)
specific deviations for one of the two sets of books. The most common proposals
advocate a partial conformity approach utilizing GAAP as a baseline but
anticipating 92
that Congress would specify certain discrete deviations for tax
1
accounting.
Partial conformity is not wholly alien to U.S. accountants. As we have seen,
firms that elect to use LIFO inventory accounting for tax purposes are required to
report earnings on the same basis. But inventory accounting is an isolated
example of book-tax conformity in the United States. Book-tax conformity is
much more common in countries that traditionally have relied less on public
markets to provide corporate finance, such as Germany, France, and Japan. 193 In
those countries mandated conformity often allows for company choice along the
lines of the U.S. LIFO/FFO example. German companies, for example, may
elect to accelerate depreciation for tax purposes only 94if the depreciation
deductions are reflected equally in the financial accounts.
Of course, in one sense, the current U.S. system could be thought of as a
"partial" book-tax conformity system. The tax code does provide that "[t]axable
income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which
the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books." 95 But the
exceptions swallow the rule, and the courts have long acknowledged that
196
taxpayers cannot rely on GAAP where contrary to tax rules and regulations.
B. Issues and Concerns with Book-Tax Conformity Proposals
My principal aim in this Part is to call attention to several unrecognized or
underappreciated problems with book-tax conformity that arise from the effects of
financial accounting on managerial and corporate behavior. However, before
addressing those issues in the next section, this section summarizes and expands
upon a number of other concerns with increased conformity.
192. See Desai, supra note 11, at 21 (suggesting this type of partial conformity); Engler,
supra note 190, at 559-61 (same); Whitaker, supra note 190, at 721-22 (same); Yin, supranote
11, at 224-25 (same); see also Shaviro, supra note 185, at 50-58 (proposing an adjustment to
the taxable income of large, public companies equal to a percentage of the difference between
unadjusted taxable income and reported earnings, but allowing for the possibility that Congress
would exempt certain tax preferences from the adjustment).
193. Paul J. Rutteman, A Comparative View ofAccounting Regulations, in THE SEC AND
ACCOUNTING: THE FIRST 50 YEARS: 1984 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARTHUR YOUNG PROFESSORS'
ROUNDTABLE 95, 99-105 (Robert H. Mundheim & Noyes E.Leech eds., 1984).
194. Id. at 100; Schon, supra note 190, at 115-16.
195. I.R.C. § 446(a) (Supp. IV 2005).
196. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 538-44 (1979) (finding no
presumption that practices consistent with GAAP are valid for tax purposes).
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1. Information Loss
The primary aim of financial accounting is to provide relevant, reliable,
consistent, and comparable financial information to the capital markets in order
to ensure efficient allocation of resources, 197 and a principal concern of
accounting researchers is that book-tax conformity would lead to a loss of
value-relevant information. 9 Generally, financial accounting standards best
fulfill their information-providing role when they produce results that mirror
economic accounting results, e.g., when financial depreciation mirrors
economic depreciation. Thus, some scholars argue that requiring financial
statements to be prepared on the basis of tax accounting rules, or even
conforming somewhere in between current financial and tax accounting rules,
would result in the loss of value-relevant information.' 99 Studies demonstrate
that financial statements are indeed less relevant in countries in which tax rules
influence financial accounting rules. 2°
However, research shows that tax and financial accounts contribute
individually to the efficiency of the market. 20 1 As a result, even if GAAP were
accepted as the basis for both books, there would be a loss of information.2 2
To be sure, the loss would be greater if financial accounts were prepared on the
basis of the tax rules, but the elimination
of either set of books would be costly
20 3
from an information perspective.

197.

See FIN.

ACCOUNTING

STANDARDS

BD.,

FACTS

ABOUT FASB

1 (2007),

http://72.3.243.42/facts/factsabout fasb.pdf(providing FASB mission statement) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
198. Hanlon et al., supra note 190, at 2; Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 12, at 5.
199. See Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 12, at 5 (referencing recent research as supporting

the predicted loss of information). While book-tax conformity could theoretically occur
anywhere along the continuum between financial accounting standards and tax accounting rules,
Hanlon and Shevlin assume that Congress would not be willing to cede control of tax rules to a
private standard setting body and that conformity would likely occur at or near tax accounting.

See id. at 18 (discussing the practicalities of conformity). But see Whitaker, supra note 190, at
709 (arguing for book-tax conformity with a financial accounting baseline and limited specific
deviations for tax purposes); Yin, supra note 11, at 224 (same).
200. See Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 12, at 23 (citing Ashiq Ali & Lee-Seok Hwang,
Country Specific Factors Related to Financial Reporting and the Value Relevance of
Accounting Data,38 J. ACCT. REs. 1 (2000)).
201. Hanlon et al., supra note 190, at 37.
202. Id.
203. See id. (estimating that if the accounts were conformed based on tax rules, the
reduction in the explanatory power of the income measure would be on the order of 50% but
arguing that even conformity at GAAP would result in the loss of incremental information
provided by the taxable income measure).
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2. Controlof Tax Policy

Some commentators doubt that Congress would be willing to cede control
over tax rules to the FASB. 204 Full conformity based on GAAP would result in
a change in tax law every time the FASB issued a new standard. Even partial
conformity with a GAAP baseline would cede substantial control of tax policy
to the FASB. Unless Congress had already enacted a specific exception for a
particular item or transaction, a change in GAAP would result in a change in
tax unless and until Congress acted to override the change for tax purposes.
Other arrangements for sharing responsibility are feasible, but a GAAP baseline
seriously conflicts with congressional control over tax
for tax assessment
5
20

policy.

Of course, some commentators, following the lead of Stanley Surrey,
would applaud a change that would make it more difficult for Congress to
implement social or economic policy via the tax code.20 6 But the idea of
Congress abandoning tax incentives is probably unrealistic. One could argue
that if Congress's principal concern was the revenue associated with the
corporate tax, Congress could easily cede responsibility for tax accounting to
the FASB and simply adjust the tax rates as necessary. However, if Congress is
as or more concerned with economic intervention via the tax code, then the
likelihood is that a GAAP baseline tax with specific exceptions would rapidly
degenerate into something approaching the current tax code as Congress
enacted various tax favors, incentives and penalties. It seems much more likely
that tax rules would serve as the basis for any book-tax conformity proposal
acceptable to Congress.
3. Instability Generally
Essentially for the reasons given above, Hanlon and Shevlin have argued
that partial conformity is inherently unstable, particularly partial conformity
based on a GAAP baseline. 20 7 Once exceptions to a GAAP-based tax are
allowed, they argue, special interest lobbying would lead to greater and greater
discontinuities. Full conformity may be unrealistic, but if achieved, it could
204. Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 12, at 5; Shevlin, supra note 190, at 435.
205. See Shevlin, supra note 190, at 434 (discussing options for shared responsibility
between Congress and the FASB).
206. See infraPart VI.C.6 (discussing inefficiencies highlighted by Surrey in the provision
of economic incentives through the tax code).
207. Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 12, at 28-30.
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possibly be maintained. It is difficult to imagine a GAAP-based tax with a
handful of specific tax exceptions not becoming two essentially separate
systems.

4. Politicizationof the FinancialAccounting Standard-SettingProcess
Compared with the tax writing process, financial accounting standard
setting seems blissfully nonpolitical. Of course, business people lobby the
FASB, 208 and Congress and the SEC exert their influence from time to time, 209
but by maintaining its emphasis on neutral rules of accounting, the FASB has
deflected a great deal of potential interference. Increased book-tax conformity
210
would almost inevitably lead to the politicization of financial accounting.
Consider the scenario in which current tax rules or some hybrid between
current tax and accounting rules enacted by Congress form the basis for both
sets of books. Financial accounting would become just as much a political
football as taxes are today, and lobbying would increase for the following
reasons: First, public companies would have more at stake in the rules selected
by Congress because these rules would control for both tax and accounting
purposes. Second, Congress's freedom to insert special interest accounting
favors (or penalties) would increase given the shift from a single goal of
promulgating neutral accounting standards to a multi-purpose, multi-policy tax
and accounting standard-setting process. Increasing the stakes in a venue that
is more susceptible to lobbying would increase the expected payoffs from
lobbying, and thus should result in more lobbying.2 1 '
208. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & Ehsan H. Feroz, Does the FASB Listen to Corporations?,
19 J. Bus. FIN. & AccT. 715, 727-29 (1992) (finding that the FASB is influenced by corporate

comment letters and that larger corporations have more influence than smaller ones).
209. Infra Part VI.C.3.
210. See Shevlin, supra note 190, at 434-35 (noting the inevitability of congressional
involvement instandard setting with increased book-tax conformity); but see Shaviro,supranote 185,
at 42-50 (providing a thorough discussion of the potential politicization problem, but proposing an
earnings adjustment to taxable income as a means of increasing book-tax conformity while minimizing

the risk of congressional intervention in the accounting standard setting process).
211. According to the economic theory ofregulation, the benefits and burdens that are granted or
imposed by the state on firms are subject to the laws ofsupply and demand, and lobbying expenditures
are determined like any other business expenditure. Managers compare the expected payoffs from
lobbying against other profit-seeking opportunities in optimizing the allocation of corporate resources.
Under this model, the stakes and susceptibility of the regulator to being influenced are important
determinants of lobbying effort and expenditure. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J.ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) (the seminal article on the economic theory of
regulation); see also FRED S. McCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHNG: POLmcIANs, RENT EXTRACTION,
AND POLmCAL ExTORTION 1-19 (1997) (providing an overview of the economic theory of regulation
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On the other hand, suppose that a GAAP-based tax approach were adopted
with specific tax deviations enacted by Congress. The FASB's influence over taxes
would be significant in any mixed responsibility scenario. Despite the FASB's
neutrality stance, businesses could be expected to increase their lobbying of that
organization, given the increased stakes involved in the FASB's pronouncements.
Moreover, because the odds of a congressional tax override would be uncertain,
pressure on individual members of Congress to intervene in the FASB's
deliberations could be intense. It may not be realistic to expect a private group of
accountants to be able to navigate these political waters and successfully set both
accounting rules and default tax rules. Even if it is feasible, this would not be an
appropriate role for a private organization like the FASB. This realization provides
some reason to think that conformity, if it is to occur, may be more likely to happen
at the tax end of the spectrum and fall firmly within congressional control. The
primary point, however, is that any book-tax conformity proposal entails the
politicization of financial accounting standard setting.
C. Book-Tax Conformity and CorporateBehavior
The costs of book-tax conformity described above are serious, but of course
the benefits could be greater. This section, however, presents several additional
concerns arising out of the influence of accounting results on managerial and
corporate behavior that further undermine the case for book-tax conformity. In
brief, the concerns are that increased book-tax conformity (1) is less likely to
forestall artificial earnings inflation than most commentators assume, and indeed
may result in excessive sacrifice of tax benefits for earnings; (2) will result in
reduced consistency in financial reporting than exists today, making cross-company
comparisons more difficult; and (3) will undermine economic incentives whether
conformity occurs at the tax end of the spectrum, the book end, or somewhere in
between.
1. Accounting and OperationalFlexibilityand the Book-Tax Tradeoff
Because of the forced tradeoff between high reported earnings and happy
investors on the one hand, and low taxable earnings and low corporate taxes on
the other, book-tax conformity has been suggested as a response both to tax
sheltering and artificial earnings inflation, depending on the dominant concern
and focusing on the burden side ofthe equation, i.e., on the power ofgovernment to extort wealth from
industry under the threat of adverse regulation).

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHA VIOR

979

at the time. Fair enough, but is book-tax conformity more likely to reduce
sheltering or inflated earnings? Where would firms come out on the continuum
between tax minimization and earnings maximization? As long as there is
some managerial discretion over accounting choice and operational decisions, it
would be impossible for a regulator to tie corporations to a point along that
continuum.
Most commentators who have addressed this issue have suggested that tax
minimization would dominate.' 2 The analysis developed herein suggests
otherwise. It seems likely that book-tax conformity would result in managers
sacrificing tax benefits for earnings to a greater extent than shareholders would
prefer, at least in the near term. Thus, increased book-tax conformity may be a
partial answer to tax sheltering, but it may also result in some reduction in share
values as managers act to maximize their own utility rather than that of
shareholders.
a. Flexibility in ManagingTaxes and Earnings
Whether conformity is achieved based on GAAP, the tax code, or
something in between, managers would retain flexibility to manage taxes and
earnings. Current GAAP is much more flexible than the tax code, and a certain
degree of financial accounting flexibility is generally viewed as a positive
feature. There are many users of financial data, and the flexibility in GAAP
allows firms to choose the accounting treatments that most efficiently portray
data and minimize contracting costs. 21 3 But given the flexibility of GAAP,
assessing corporate tax on reported income would provide companies with
broad discretion to minimize tax or maximize reported earnings with respect to
such key inputs as recognition of revenues and costs, inventory valuation, and
depreciation.214
A book-tax conformity approach utilizing a GAAP baseline with specific
tax departures could provide either more or less flexibility than a straight
GAAP-based tax, depending on whether the departures were mandated or made
optional. In all likelihood, the result would be some of both. One can imagine
Congress providing optional tax incentives for items such as depreciation and

212. Infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
213. Supra note 45 and sources cited therein.
214. See JAMIE PRATr, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING IN AN ECONOMIC CONTEXT 84-89,279-86,
368-73 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining accounting rules and choices relating to revenue and expense
recognition, inventory valuation, and depreciation).
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mandatory tax penalties for items such as nonperformance based executive
compensation.2 15
The current tax code provides less flexibility than GAAP, but some
discretion does exist. For example, accelerated tax depreciation is not
mandatory; firms can elect to apply straight-line tax depreciation.21 6 Firms may
instead of
elect to deduct certain research and experimental 2expenditures
17
capitalizing them, but they are not required to do so.

Of course, even if accounting rules were nondiscretionary, accounting
discretion would remain to the extent of operational discretion. For example,
many companies have significant flexibility in managing accruals at year
end.218 Under any of these approaches, operational flexibility would leave
firms with choices between minimizing taxes and maximizing reported
earnings.
b. The Book-Tax Tradeoff
How would firms exercise accounting and operational discretion in a
book-tax conformity regime? Firm believers in the efficient capital markets
hypothesis suggest that the primary result would be reduced reported income.
Calvin Johnson has argued that companies would find other ways to
communicate information to investors and would manage their books solely
with an eye to minimizing taxes. 22191 Michelle Hanlon and Terry Shevlin have
suggested that book-tax conformity could lead to a "race to the bottom" on
effective tax rates. 220 Peter Joos and Mark Lang have argued that book-tax
France "has provided incentives to reduce taxes by
conformity in Germany and
22
reporting lower profits.

'

215. These approaches would be consistent with the current tax code. As discussed below,
accelerated tax depreciation is optional under I.R.C. § 168(b) (Supp. IV 2005). Infra note 216
and accompanying text. On the other hand, the tax code contains mandatory tax penalties
related to excessive provision of nonperformance based executive compensation. I.R.C.
§ 162(m).
216. I.R.C. § 168(b)(3)(D).
217. Id. § 174(a).
218.

See, e.g., Paul K. Chaney & Craig M. Lewis, Earnings Management and Firm

Valuation UnderAsymmetric Information, 1 J. CORP. FIN. 319, 319-20 (1995) (citing studies
and relating anecdotal evidence of accrual management).
219.

Johnson, supra note 12, at 427.

220.

Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 12, at 28.

221. Peter Joos & Mark Lang, The Effects of Accounting Diversity: Evidence from the
European Union, 32 J. ACCT. REs. 141, 145 (1994).
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Other commentators are less convinced, pointing out the moderating effect
of management's motivation to report high earnings. 222 The lessons of this
Article lend support to the latter view: Increased book-tax conformity would
likely lead to increased instances of managers sacrificing legitimate tax benefits
in order to maintain or boost reported earnings.
The empirical literature on accounting choice provides evidence that
increased book-tax conformity that leaves discretion with managers to choose
between high earnings/high tax and low earnings/low tax treatments would not
necessarily result in tax minimization. Faced with tradeoffs between asset sales
and spin-offs and the possibility of disqualifying incentive stock options,
managers routinely forgo tax benefits in order to preserve earnings.223
Moreover, although the inventory accounting literature suggests that managers
of some large firms get the tradeoff "right," i.e., choose LIFO and cash flow
over earnings, we cannot be sure that of the large majority of firms that utilize
FIFO, a significant number aren't getting this wrong.224
Of course, positive accounting theory indicates that, to some extent,
sacrificing taxes could be in the shareholders' interest. A tax minimization
position would result in lower reported earnings that would increase the
expected cost of debt covenant violation and/or require firms to contract around
GAAP.
Consider depreciation. Although businesses are permitted to employ one
of a number of approved financial depreciation methods for various depreciable
assets, the most common technique is straight-line depreciation, which simply
prorates the cost of an asset, less estimated salvage value, over the estimated
useful life of the asset. 225 Straight-line financial depreciation is widely admired
for its simplicity, but it is unlikely that this trait explains its dominance. After
all, the same firms that utilize straight-line depreciation for financial reporting
purposes utilize accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. Rather, straight-line
depreciation is used for book purposes because, compared to the other
permitted methods, it results in reduced depreciation expense and greater
reported income in early years and increased expense and reduced reported

222.

Schon, supra note 190, at 143.

223. Supra notes 130-35, 140-43 and accompanying text.
224. Supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
225. DAVID R. HERWITZ, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 471 (1980). See also
K. FRED SKOUSEN ET AL., FrNANCIAL ACCOUNTING 354 (6th ed. 1996). Skousen, Albrecht, and
Stice relate a survey of 600 companies' annual reports finding that 558 employed straight-line
depreciation, 50 employed the units-of-production method, and 106 employed accelerated
methods. Obviously, a single company can employ different depreciation methods for different
assets.
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income in later years. 226 In other words, utilizing straight-line financial
depreciation allows firms to maximize the present value of earnings reported to
investors, while adopting accelerated depreciation methods for tax purposes
allows firms to minimize the present value of taxes.
A firm that previously employed straight-line financial depreciation and
switched to accelerated depreciation for both tax and book under a regime
requiring consistency between book and tax but allowing for choice would
suffer a reduction in reported earnings.227 The debt covenant theory predicts
that for some firms such a change would result in an indirect decrease in share
price. The markets would see through the accounting change in pricing the
company's securities, but absent renegotiation, the reduction in reported
earnings would increase the likelihood of the firm violating covenants on
existing debt. Covenants on new debt could be based on straight-line
depreciation, despite the firm's election to use accelerated depreciation in
reporting earnings, but doing so would entail keeping an additional set of nonGAAP books. Reduced political costs might offset the debt covenant effect, as
the reduction in reported earnings deflected the attention of congressional tax
writers. In addition, sticky employment contracts that are based in part on
reported earnings would tend to result in reduced compensation payments that
might or might not be accompanied by reduced productivity. It is unlikely that
these effects would be large or persistent, but to some extent, the potential costs
of financial distress initially and additional bookkeeping costs going forward
would offset the tax savings associated with reporting the lowest possible levels
of tax and financial income.
More importantly, however, given the direct and indirect effect of reported
earnings on their own compensation and other factors, managerial
decisionmakers are likely to sacrifice taxes for earnings to a greater extent than
necessary to maximize share value. Book-tax conformity may reduce tax
sheltering, but there is nothing to force managers to balance taxes against
earnings in the shareholders' interests.

226. See SKOUSEN ET AL., supranote 225, at 354 (suggesting that the popularity of straightline depreciation results from its simplicity and its effect on the timing of reported income).
227. Surprisingly, perhaps, a switch in the other direction to straight-line depreciation for
tax as well as book purposes would have no impact on income reported after-tax, although it
would clearly affect the timing of taxes. With respect to depreciation, tax and financial books
are truly independent. The tax expense subtracted in calculating book earnings is adjusted to
neutralize the effect of any timing differences between the depreciation methods used for book
and tax. Lillian F. Mills, Five Things Economists and Lawyers Can Learnfrom Accountants:
An IllustrationUsing the Domestic ProductionActivities Deduction, 59 NAT. TAX J. 585, 586
(2006).
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To continue with the depreciation example, the reduction in reported
earnings resulting from a switch from straight-line to accelerated financial
depreciation would, absent renegotiation, result in reduced eamings-based
bonuses for management. To be sure, managers faced with the imposition of
increased book-tax conformity should be able to renegotiate their bonus
formulas to adjust for the new regime. However, managers might choose to
preserve their bonuses unilaterally (e.g., by electing to utilize straight-line
depreciation for tax and book), rather than attempting to negotiate a new bonus
formula, which might be perceived as a "raise," even if the adjustment would
be fully justified by the change in accounting convention.228
Managers focused primarily on achieving quarterly earnings targets--out
of career concerns, honest concerns about share value, or both-also might find
themselves sacrificing taxes in choosing conforming accounting treatments for
book and tax. Of course, to the extent that analyst earnings forecasts accurately
reflect a company's choice of accounting rules, managers should be indifferent.
Inevitably, however, analysts will fail to take into account every choice, and
survey evidence indicates that CFOs are skeptical as to the ability of analysts to
see through these choices.229
It is possible that operational decisions and accounting decisions would
reflect different book-tax tradeoffs in a world of increased conformity. The
empirical literature could be read as suggesting that earnings effects exert
greater influence over discrete, operational decisions, such as that in Kamin,

228. The revised bonus might be perceived as a raise for several reasons. Imagine that
Congress were to impose corporate taxes on the basis of reported GAAP income. In order to
minimize taxes, firms might select income-reducing options among permissible GAAP rules,

e.g., accelerated depreciation instead of straight-line depreciation. Obviously, these choices
would reduce reported earnings. In order to maintain the dollar value of executive bonuses, the
percentage of earnings dedicated to bonuses would have to increase. That change in formulas

could be perceived as a raise. In addition, when the bonus is paid, it will, of course, represent a
larger fraction of earnings. Again, this change could be perceived as a raise, despite the fact that

it merely adjusts for the changes in accounting rules.
The managerial power theory of executive compensation suggests that managers will be
loath to call unnecessary attention to their compensation. See generally Bebchuk et al., supra
note 61, at 783-91 (discussing the managerial power approach). If managers can preserve pay

through "self-help" accounting choices, why should they risk triggering outrage by renegotiating
compensation contracts?
229. See Graham et al., supra note 38, at 26 (noting CFO concerns regarding inexperienced
stock analysts). One might expect that while analysts might not account for the effect on
earnings of minor accounting choices with small impacts, they would properly account for the

effect of major accounting choices, such as depreciation techniques. However, even with
respect to depreciation, there are numerous small subsidiary questions that affect the timing of
expenses. In other words, the choice between straight-line and accelerated depreciation is just
the beginning.
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than over choices of accounting procedures with multi-year effects, such as
inventory accounting.230 Moreover, CFOs surveyed by Graham, Harvey, and
Rajgopal indicate greater willingness to adjust operations than accounting
practices in achieving earnings targets. 3 It is also possible that some firms
might initially sacrifice tax benefits to maintain earnings but adjust over time to
the new environment. In any event, the tax/earnings balance struck by U.S.
corporate management, in aggregate, is likely to result in share value reductions
and represents an underappreciated effect of increased book-tax conformity.
2. Discretionand Cross-Company Consistency in FinancialReporting
While enhanced book-tax conformity would increase consistency between
the books of a given firm, conformity could result in a decrease in the
consistency and comparability of accounting results between companies in the
same industry, assuming some flexibility in accounting treatment in a book-tax
conformity regime. Assuming that the markets see through accounting
presentation, decreased inter-company consistency is not necessarily fatal to
book-tax conformity proposals, but it does represent an added cost. To some
extent, analysts would have to work harder to produce comparable figures.232
Imagine that corporate taxes were to be assessed on the basis of GAAP
income. Firms would face a tradeoff between tax minimization and earnings
maximization. In the case of depreciation, managers focused on tax
minimization would adopt highly accelerated depreciation methods; those
focused on earnings would select straight-line depreciation; some might
compromise by selecting a modestly accelerated depreciation method. What
factors would drive the choice? The debt covenant and political cost
hypotheses suggest that degree of leverage and firm size would be
determinants. In a previous section,233 I argued that management earnings
preferences would be a key factor, and the strength of those preferences and the
extent to which they would be satisfied would depend on executive
230. Supra Part III.D.
231. Graham et al., supra note 38, at 18.
232. Although this section focuses on cross-company consistency of financial reporting,
cross-company consistency of tax reporting is also an important issue. Achieving conformity by
assessing taxes on the basis of GAAP would result in increased company discretion and
variability in taxable income and taxes, which could have an adverse effect on the perceived
fairness of the tax system and taxpayer compliance in general. Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax
Conformity and the CorporateTax Shelter Debate: Assessing the ProposedSection 475 Markto-Market Safe Harbor,24 VA. TAX REv. 301, 370-80 (2004).
233. Part V.C.1.
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compensation design and other factors, including the quality of corporate
governance. Given this multiplicity of factors, which may or may not be
correlated among firms in a particular industry, accounting choices could vary
widely, even among firms in a single industry. Surely, they would vary more
widely than they do today.
I do not wish to overemphasize this point, and I do not suggest that the
cost resulting from greater inter-firm variation in accounting choices would be
significant. A nuanced view of the ECMH recognizes that information
gathering and assimilation is costly. Decreased inter-firm consistency in
accounting choice would directionally increase analytical costs, but in all
likelihood the impact on market efficiency would be minimal.

3. Book-Tax Conformity and Economic Incentives
We have already considered the effect of book-tax conformity on firm
choices among acceptable accounting treatments and operational decisions with
accounting implications, such as year-end accruals. This section considers a
related but much more pervasive and important issue: How would book-tax
conformity affect the explicit economic incentives Congress provides in the tax
code and the implicit economic incentives embedded in GAAP? I argue that
increased book-tax conformity would undermine economic incentives whether
conformity is based on GAAP, on the tax code, or on something in between.
a. Tax Incentives
As every student of basic federal income tax knows, the tax code is riddled
with provisions that have little or nothing to do with "defining" income, i.e.,
determining the right level of income subject to tax in a platonic sense, and
everything to do with providing incentives or subsidies to taxpayers. A familiar
example is Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code which generally excludes
from the gross income of employees the value of employer provided health care
and health insurance. Other in-kind benefits are included in an employee's
income, so this exclusion represents a clear subsidy for the creation of employer
funded health care plans.
Many of these tax incentives are directed at corporate behavior and at
bonus'
spurring business investment, including accelerated tax depreciation,
234. Taxpayers are allowed to take deductions for depreciation earlier and in greater
amounts than "economic" depreciation would provide. Under I.R.C. § 168, the salvage values
of assets are ignored, increasing the depreciable amount; the periods over which deductions are
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depreciation,235 investment tax credits,2 36 and special "expensing" provisions
permitting immediate deduction of expenditures that otherwise must be
capitalized and recovered through depreciation.237 The effect of each of these
tax incentives is to increase the present value of deductions (and/or tax credits)
associated with the expenditure and thus reduce the present value of taxes. By
reducing the tax burden associated with qualified capital expenditures,
Congress expects businesses will devote more of their resources to or accelerate
capital investment.
Full book-tax conformity utilizing GAAP as a baseline would eliminate
many of these tax incentives.238 Unless the tax incentives were replaced with
direct subsidies or other nontax incentives, we should expect some shift away
from capital investment. Moreover, while some of the investment incentives
are generic (accelerated depreciation applies to almost all depreciable assets
and has been relatively stable over time), others are narrowly targeted. For
example, investment tax credits currently are available for alternative energy
development2 39 and historic structure rehabilitation. 240 Taxpayers may elect to
deduct or capitalize periodical circulation expenses,24 ' certain research and
24 3
242 soil and water conservation
costs,
experimental expenditures,
environmental remediation costs, 244 and certain other expenditures. 245 In a bid
to spur economic recovery in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress
implemented a limited term "bonus" depreciation provision allowing businesses
to deduct immediately 30% (later increased to 50%) of otherwise depreciable
taken are shortened, often by as much as one-half of the assets' useful lives; and the
depreciation methods generally are accelerated, with most assets being subject to 200% or 150%
declining balance depreciation. I.R.C. §§ 168(b), (e) (Supp. IV 2005).
235. Id. § 168(k)(4). Bonus depreciation is discussed further infra note 246 and
accompanying text.
236. Infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
237. Infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
238. However, some tax incentives would remain. For example, although GAAP limits
depreciation to cost minus salvage value, accelerated depreciation methods are permitted. See
ROBERT LIBBY ET AL., FINANcIAL ACCOUNTING

432-35 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that the 200%

declining balance method is the most accelerated depreciation scheme allowable for financial
reporting purposes).
239. I.R.C. § 48 (Supp. IV 2005).
240. Id. § 47.
241. Id. § 173.
242. Id. § 174.
243. Id. § 175.
244. Id. § 198.
245. See e.g., id. § 179A (providing a deduction for the purchase of qualified clean-fuels
vehicles).
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capital expenditures. 246 Although one can argue that these incentives could be
more efficiently delivered by other means, the loss of these incentives is an
argument against taxing corporate income on the basis of GAAP. More to the
point, Congress is unlikely to relinquish the opportunity to intervene, whether
its focused incentives reflect special interest lobbying or rational responses to
market failures.

b. Accounting Incentives
One might be tempted to think that the economic incentive problem could
be solved by conforming book and tax at the tax end of the spectrum, rather
than the GAAP end, in other words, by reporting taxable income to both
investors and the IRS. But that is not the case. As we have seen, the empirical
evidence indicates that accounting rules affect managerial behavior much as tax
rules do, and contracting and agency theory explain why accounting rules have
persistent incentive properties. Adopting the Internal Revenue Code for
financial accounting would eliminate many implicit accounting incentives.
Reconsider depreciation. As noted above, today most firms utilize
straight-line financial depreciation for most assets because, relative to the other
GAAP alternatives, the method maximizes the present value of reported
247
earnings.
Because managers are motivated to report high earnings, the
option to employ earnings enhancing straight-line depreciation (relative to
accelerated depreciation) can be viewed as a financial accounting incentive for
capital investment.
If firms were required to utilize the tax depreciation rules in preparing
their financial reports, their appetite for capital investment would be lessened.
Under the accelerated depreciation methods generally used for tax, both first
year expense and the total present value of reported expense associated with
capital investment would increase substantially. For the reasons discussed in
our consideration of the impact of book-tax conformity allowing for managerial
discretion--essentially agency and other contracting cost explanations-this
change would lead to deferral of capital investment or substitution away from
capital investment at the margin. 248 In fact, there are two reasons to think that
246.

The 30% bonus depreciation allowance applied to certain property acquired after

September 10, 2001 and before May 6, 2003. I.R.C. § 168(k)(1), (4) (Supp. V 2005). The

allowance was increased to 50% for property acquired after May 5, 2003, and placed in service
before January 1, 2005. Id. § 168(k)(4).
247.

Supra note 226 and accompanying text.

248. Supra Part V.C. 1.b. In brief, all else being equal, accelerated expenses would
increase the present value of the expected cost of violating floating GAAP debt covenants,

64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 927 (2007)

the behavioral effect of earnings would be greater in this scenario than in a
realm of discretionary book-tax conformity. First, the survey conducted by
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal indicates that executives are more likely to
adjust operations to achieve earnings targets than they are to adjust accounting
practices. 249 Second, the empirical evidence is at least consistent with the idea
that managers are more sensitive to earnings effects when making discrete onetime decisions, such as capital investment decisions, than with respect to
routine, ongoing matters.25 0 Thus, the impact of eliminating implicit
accounting incentives on operational decisions could be significant.
To be sure, the tax code permits firms to utilize straight-line
depreciation, 2 1 but even this election would not fully eliminate the earnings hit
from the change in rules, given nonelective tax rules related to salvage value
and depreciation periods that also accelerate deductions. z Of course, any
depreciation baseline is essentially arbitrary. There is no one correct
depreciation technique that reproduces economic depreciation for all assets.
But whether straight-line financial depreciation represents a subsidy or
normality is unimportant, the point is that this and other gaps between GAAP
and the tax code can be thought of as tax incentives, accounting incentives, or a
mix of the two.
In many cases "GAAP incentives" are simply the flip-side of tax
incentives. In other words, the financial accounting treatment may approximate
economic reality, while the tax rules reflect subsidies. To some extent, this is
the case for depreciation. Another example is the disparate treatment of
municipal bond interest. The interest on such bonds generally is not included
in taxable income, 253 providing a subsidy to state and local governments that
are able to reduce their borrowing costs through the issuance of these bonds.254
But the interest received is included in reported earnings.25 5 Adopting a tax
baseline for both tax and book purposes would preserve the tax incentive but

reduce the present value of earnings-based bonuses, and increase the likelihood of missing
earnings targets in the year of investment.
249. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing this finding).
250. Supra Part III.D.
251. I.R.C. § 168(b)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 2005).
252. See id. §§ 168(b)(4), (e) (stating that the salvage value is zero and setting forth a
mandatory property classification table).
253. Id. § 103(a).
254. See GRAETz & ScHENK, supra note 145, at 215-17 (noting that the subsidy is not
perfectly efficient as part of the benefit is captured by high bracket taxpayers who invest in such
bonds).

255.

LIBBY ET AL.,

supra note 238, at 514.
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introduce a financial accounting disincentive for corporations to purchase
municipal bonds.
In other cases, GAAP permits income-increasing or income-accelerating
accounting procedures relative to clearly more neutral treatments incorporated
in the tax code. Examples include the failure to require expensing of
compensatory stock options prior to 2006 and the recent elimination of the
requirement to amortize purchased goodwill. 6 Because these deviations
resulted from industry lobbying, it is not surprising that they are income
enhancing. What is surprising is that they have not been recognized as
incentives, although they should be. Conforming GAAP to the arguably more
neutral tax treatment of these items would tend to discourage the use of
compensatory options and discourage merger activity.
The bottom line is that whether an accounting rule can be said to be
neutral and economically correct and the corresponding tax rule to be the
deviation and the incentive, or vice versa, it is important to mind the gap.
Eliminating the gap in either direction will reduce the tax incentive, create an
accounting disincentive, or do some of both.

4. Economic Consequences andFlexible Book-Tax Conformity
The foregoing analysis suggests that reduction of the gap between tax and
financial accounting would have adverse economic consequences however the
gap is reduced. But it also suggests that if full conformity is the objective, how
it is achieved matters. Allowing firms to choose the basis for conformity could
minimize the adverse economic consequences. On the other hand, given
flexibility, managers should be expected to make the earnings/tax tradeoffs that
maximize their own utility, rather than shareholder value. On balance, it is
unclear whether providing flexibility in book-tax conformity would benefit
shareholders or not.
Individual company flexibility in achieving book-tax conformity is
common. As we have seen, the one example of book-tax conformity currently
in place in the United States requires consistency between LIFO and FIFO
accounting for book and tax reporting, but leaves the choice up to individual
256. Nonqualified stock options result in a tax deduction equal to the amount of income
recognized by the optionee in the year of option exercise. I.R.C. § 83(h) (Supp. IV 2005).
Under I.R.C. § 197, purchased goodwill is amortized ratably over a fifteen-year period. Id.

§ 197(a). Under GAAP, purchased goodwill need only be recognized for financial accounting
purposes to the extent that it is impaired. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 142, GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS 1, 11
(June 2001).
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companies.257 Similarly, German rules allow firms to choose between straightline and accelerated depreciation, as long as they are consistent.258 Moreover,
these choices need not be binary. One can imagine permitting firms to select
from a range of depreciation methods as long as internal consistency is
maintained.
Shareholder-loyal managers could use such flexibility to minimize the
adverse economic consequences of book-tax conformity. Firms that were
relatively insensitive to reported earnings (because nonpublic or flush with
cash) would select the conforming treatment that minimized taxes, such as
accelerated depreciation. Firms that were relatively insensitive to taxes
(because of large net operating losses) would select the conforming treatment
that maximized earnings. Firms in between these extremes would trade off
earnings maximization against tax minimization.
Well governed firms would make these tradeoffs with an eye towards
maximizing share value. The concern, of course, is that managers of some
firms would sacrifice taxes for earnings to a greater extent than necessary to
optimize share value. Of course, even if conforming treatments are specified
by Congress, many managers would utilize operational flexibility in the same
way. However, adding flexibility in accounting treatments is likely to
exacerbate the agency problem.
5. A Note on Social Costs
Recognizing that accounting rules have economic consequences does not
necessarily mean that ignoring those consequences entails social costs. Should
we care whether corporations minimize their taxes or whether implicit
accounting incentives are eliminated through book-tax conformity? Yes, we
should. First, failure to optimize taxes and maximize shareholder value results
in reduced incentives to invest in equity securities and ultimately in reduced
capital formation. 259 Second, in some cases, sacrificing tax benefits for
earnings may directly result in inefficient allocation of resources. Imagine a
manager faced with the option of selling a depreciated asset or spinning the
asset off to shareholders. As in Kamin, sale would result both in a tax benefit
and an earnings hit, and we will assume, would be in the shareholders' interest.
Spinning off the asset to avoid the earnings hit not only sacrifices share value, it
257. I.R.C. § 472(c) (Supp. IV 2005).
258. Supra note 194 and accompanying text.
259. Cf CLARK, supranote 171, at 274 (making a similar argument that insider trading acts
as a tax on investors which may chill capital formation).
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also may delay the transfer of the asset to a more highly valuing user. 60
Similarly, during the 1990s, managers probably over-utilized accountingpreferred stock option
compensation when restricted stock or cash would have
261
efficient.
been more
This final point may lead readers to question the social value of preserving
other accounting incentives. I have argued that the incentives for investing in
capital assets would be lessened by conforming book and tax depreciation
conventions, but this is troubling only if one believes that such incentives are
necessary or appropriate. The pre-2005 stock option rules probably were
neither, but the stock option "incentive" was somewhat inadvertent, and the
situation may be quite different with respect to other provisions. Consider
capital investment incentives. Congress apparently believes that certain capital
investment incentives are appropriate, enacting various general and specific tax
incentives for investment from time to time. The overall level of corporate
investment depends as much on the financial accounting rules concerning
investment as on Congress's explicit tax incentives. Thus, we should be wary
of undermining the overall scheme by eliminating implicit accounting
incentives for investment.
D. FurtherBook-Tax Conformity Alternatives andAlternatives
to Conformity
Full book-tax conformity is problematic from an economic consequences
perspective. Better from this standpoint are partial book-tax conformity
proposals, such as the idea of utilizing a GAAP baseline with specific tax
deviations adopted by Congress. For example, Mitchell Engler has proposed a
more nuanced approach to book-tax conformity that would maintain intended
tax incentives, such as accelerated depreciation, while closing pernicious
gaps.262 Maintaining the disparate treatment of depreciation for tax and book
purposes would maintain current tax and accounting incentives. Further,
compared to the German flexible depreciation model, this proposal would limit
the extent to which managers would inappropriately sacrifice taxes for reported
earnings. The problem, of course, is identifying the pernicious gaps. Almost
260. The paradigm case would be the spin-off of a corporate division as a new publicly
traded corporation managed by individuals who were formerly part of the parent company's
management team. Ultimately, this former division may be absorbed by a higher valuing user,
in which case, the intermediate spin-off simply postponed the efficiency-enhancing transition.
261. Supra Part II.C.
262. See Engler, supranote 190, at 599-600 (concluding that a limited approach to booktax conformity could compensate for the shortcomings of a more comprehensive approach).
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all deviations between GAAP and the tax code result in tax and/or accounting
incentives. And, of course, as Hanlon and Shevlin have argued, the stability of
partial book-tax conformity is open to question.26 3
Although, at first blush, increased book-tax conformity seems to be an
attractive approach to combating tax sheltering and artificial earnings inflation,
commentators have pointed out numerous problems with proposals for
enhanced conformity. The adverse economic consequences of increasing booktax conformity, whatever the method, add to the arguments against adopting
this tool and in favor of other means of attacking these problems, principally
enhanced disclosure and reconciliation of book-tax differences.2 6 Detailed
consideration of the merits of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is worth noting that unlike increased book-tax conformity,
enhanced disclosure and reconciliation would add to the information available
to the market and would have little or no economic consequence. Like
footnotes to accounting statements, the tax reconciliation reports would have no
affect on reported earnings or taxes paid. Of course, mandating more extensive
reconciliations would increase rather than decrease compliance costs, but given
the adverse economic consequences of book-tax conformity and other
drawbacks, disclosure and reconciliation may be the superior approach.
VI. InstrumentalAccounting
This final Part considers a series of related policy questions that are
prompted by recognition of the economic consequences of accounting
standards, as outlined in the previous Parts: If earnings-decreasing shifts in
GAAP made to increase book-tax conformity would have adverse economic
consequences, would earnings-increasing adjustments to GAAP have positive
economic consequences? Book-tax conformity aside, should we consider the
economic consequences of accounting in the standard-setting process? More
affirmatively, should accounting standards be used instrumentally as a means of
encouraging investment or otherwise shaping corporate behavior, as an
alternative to tax incentives, direct subsidies, and legal mandates?
Of course, there would be drawbacks to adopting accounting standards
that deviate from economic accounting, but in a second-best world, they might
serve as a valuable addition to the public policy toolbox. Financial accounting
incentives could provide powerful levers for shaping corporate behavior and
263. Supra note 207 and accompanying text.
264. See generally Mills & Plesko, supra note 186 (proposing revisions to the tax
schedules used to reconcile tax and book income).
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could mold the behavior of organizations indifferent to tax incentives.
However, the costs would be significant as well. Embracing instrumental
accounting would open up the standard-setting process to lobbying and
potential capture by the interest group with the most at stake-corporate
management. In addition, purposeful deviation from economic accounting
would diminish the usefulness of accounting reports to investors and other
users. This final Part briefly considers the potential benefits and costs of
instrumental accounting. Although an omniscient and benevolent power could
increase social welfare through the use of explicit accounting incentives,
Congress is not such a power, and this Part tentatively concludes that social
welfare is probably maximized by minimizing Congress's role in accounting
and leaving the FASB to achieve, as well as it can, "neutral" standards of
accounting.
A. How Would InstrumentalAccounting Work?
Instrumental accounting would entail designing substantive financial
accounting standards with a view towards shaping managerial, and thus
corporate, behavior. Analogous to tax incentives and penalties, accounting
incentives and penalties would represent purposeful deviations from ideal or
"economic" accounting standards, i.e., standards that result in income figures
that most closely approximate real world results. Historically, the FASB has
rejected deviations from economic accounting for the purpose of providing
incentives. 265 This is not to say, however, that current accounting standards
always match economic accounting. Achievement of ideal accounting
standards is limited by at least two factors. First, the fundamental principal of
conservatism results in a bias in favor of early recognition of expense and
deferred recognition of income versus economic accounting.266 Second, ideal
accounting would be prohibitively costly. Given the almost infinite variety of
circumstances encountered by businesses, some simplifying rules ofrecognition
must be employed to make the system operable.267 Within these constraints,

however, the FASB has sought to approximate economic accounting.
265. See FACTS ABOUT FASB, supra note 197, at 1 (providing FASB's mission statement).
266. See Ross L. Watts, Conservatism in Accounting: Part I: Explanation and
Implications, 17 ACCT. HoRizoNs 207, 208 (2003) (examining alternative explanations for and
implications of conservatism in accounting, which at the extreme is defined by the adage
"anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses").
267. Consider depreciation expense. Economic depreciation would reflect the estimated
reduction in value of a depreciable item year by year and would be highly idiosyncratic.
Because the cost of determining and maintaining hundreds or thousands of separate depreciation
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However, the potential for financial accounting incentives is plain. As an
example, let us again return to depreciation. As noted in the previous Part, shifting
from straight-line to accelerated financial depreciation would result in a reduction in
the present value of reported earnings, thereby discouraging capital investment.
Suppose, however, that Congress were to direct the SEC to permit decelerated
financial depreciation for a certain class of assets.26' Businesses purchasing these
assets could adopt a depreciation schedule that would result in even greater reported
income in early years (because of smaller deductions in early years), with offsetting
reductions in income in later years, compared against straight-line depreciation.
Given all of the incentives discussed in previous Parts for managers to increase the
present value of reported earnings, the option to adopt decelerated financial
depreciation should spur investment in this class of assets.269
The recent treatment of employee stock options suggests an even more direct
means of providing accounting incentives-permitting companies to simply
"footnote" the relevant expense rather than reducing reported earnings. Suppose,
for example, that Congress wished to spur corporate charitable contributions. These
contributions are deductible for corporate tax purposes, 270 but many corporations
pay little or no tax due to losses incurred in previous years, other tax incentives that
they have embraced, and in some cases, questionable tax shelters.27 ' Moreover, the
schedules for the various vehicles, pieces of equipment, and structures owned by a business
would be prohibitive, financial accounting standards provide for a limited menu of depreciation
schedules.
268. Decelerated, or sinking fund, depreciation involves relatively small depreciation
deductions initially that increase over the useful life of the asset. Decelerated depreciation
matches economic depreciation for assets that suffer an increasing annual decline in value over
their useful lives.
269. In brief, and all else being equal, postponing expenses would reduce the present value
of the expected cost of violating floating GAAP debt covenants, increase the present value of
earnings-based bonuses, and reduce the likelihood of missing earnings targets in the year of
investment. CFOs interviewed by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal report being much less
concerned about achieving earnings targets down the road than in the present quarter. Graham
et al., supra note 38, at 20. Their hope is that their firms will grow sufficiently to deliver greater
earnings in future periods. Id. This optimism nicely supports the efficacy of significantly
decelerated financial depreciation as an incentive. In the year of the investment (and probably
the decision), the reduction in net income would be very small and unlikely to threaten
achievement of targets. The real hit to earnings from the expenditure would arise in future
periods when optimistic executives would expect sufficient earnings from operations to cover
the depreciation expense. To be sure, as Dan Shaviro notes in a recent paper, accounting
incentives aimed at investment could produce a clientele effect but no overall effect on activity
if the marginal investor does not value the earnings benefit. See Shaviro, supranote 185, at 37.
270. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (b)(2) (Supp. IV 2005) (authorizing deductions for corporate
charitable contributions but limiting the amount deductible to 10% of a corporation's taxable
income).
271. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX LIABILITIES
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tax deduction will only go so far in spurring contributions by even tax paying
businesses. Thus, Congress might decide that further incentives are in order.
Suppose that Congress were to permit companies to refrain from "expensing"
qualifying contributions, as long as the contributions were fully disclosed in a
footnote to the financial statements, just as stock option expense was footnoted
between 1995 and 2005. The result, of course, would be that charitable
contributions would be free from an accounting perspective, and much more
attractive to managers. Obviously, this footnoting technique could be used with
virtually any current corporate expense that Congress wished to encourage, such as
the cost of employer provided health care (either in place of or in addition to the
current tax incentive), qualified pension contributions, etc.

B. Advantages ofInstrumentalAccounting
Accounting incentives would appear to be powerful and flexible devices for
shaping corporate behavior. Are there other advantages to utilizing accounting
incentives in lieu of tax incentives, direct subsidies, or mandates? At first blush, the
fact that accounting incentives do not drain the public fisc (as direct subsidies or tax
subsidies do) would seem to be a large advantage, but on closer review this factor
does not yield a social benefit. The real advantage of accounting incentives would
probably lie in their ability to complement tax incentives.
Replacing tax incentives or direct subsidies with accounting incentives would
reduce the burden on the public fisc. As Surrey pointed out, direct governmental
272
subsidies and tax incentives have an equivalent impact on the public fisc.
Replacing a tax incentive, such as accelerated tax depreciation, with a direct subsidy
that returns the same aggregate dollars to the eligible businesses would have no
overall effect on tax rates because the additional tax revenues raised by eliminating
the tax incentive would be needed to fund the direct subsidy.273 On the other hand,
replacing either a tax incentive or a direct subsidy with an accounting incentive
reduces the burden on the public fisc.

oF FOREIGN- AND U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1996-2000, at 2, 9 tbl.1 (2004) (reporting

that 63% of all U.S.-controlled corporations and 45.3% of large U.S.-controlled corporations
(defined as those with at least $250 million in assets or $50 million in gross receipts) reported
no federal income tax liability for the year 2000).
272. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 726
(1970) (comparing the impact of direct government assistance and tax incentives on the
economy).
273. Id.
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This property of accounting incentives is shared by tax penalties.
Encouraging businesses to do X by taxing the alternative Yalso appears to be
fisc-friendly, but the reduced drain on the fisc does not necessarily translate into
a social benefit in either case. This is because the direct subsidy or tax
incentive represents a transfer, as well as an incentive. 274 Of course, Congress
may prefer incentives that are not accompanied by transfers, such as tax
penalties and accounting incentives, because these devices mask the appearance
of larger government, but analysts need to avoid being taken in by the
illusion.275
Rather than focusing on the direct impact on the public fisc, the
appropriate way to evaluate accounting incentives relative to the alternatives is
to consider the efficiency with which the incentive is delivered. The empirical
evidence suggests that firms are quite sensitive to accounting considerations,
but it is difficult to assess the relative sensitivity of firms to accounting, tax, and
direct subsidies. Contracting and agency theory tell us that corporate sensitivity
to accounting incentives would vary significantly depending on company
leverage, size, executive compensation design, corporate governance, and other
factors that influence managerial sensitivity to reported earnings. Of course,
corporate sensitivity to tax incentives varies as well, and a mix of tax and
accounting incentives potentially could be optimal. Firms that are flush with
cash and profits may be relatively insensitive to reported earnings but quite
sensitive to tax incentives, while firms that are unprofitable and nearing
financial distress may be relatively insensitive to tax incentives but highly
sensitive to earnings-increasing accounting choices.276 However, the overall
efficiency of instrumental accounting is reduced by the factors discussed in the
next several sections.
274. See generally Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)RelevanceofDistributionandLabor Supply
Distortionto Government Policy, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (2004).
275. Cf Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration's Policy of
Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous FiscalGap, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1285, 1304 (2004)
(arguing that the notion that the Bush tax cuts shrank the size of government rests on a spending
illusion that confuses the nominal flow of dollars between the government and individuals with
the actual impact of the government on the economy).
276. As discussed supra note 271, a majority of U.S.-controlled corporations reported no
tax liability for 2000. However, because corporate tax losses can be carried forward and back in
time, a company reporting no tax liability for a particular year is not necessarily insensitive to
tax incentives. See I.R.C. § 172 (Supp. IV 2005) (providing for net operating loss carryovers
and carrybacks). In addition, some tax incentives may be transferred (i.e., sold) to firms that
have positive tax liabilities. See, e.g., David P. Hariton, Tax Benefits, Tax Administration,and
Legislative Intent, 53 TAx LAW. 579, 581-82 (2000) (discussing certain leasing transactions
having a primary purpose of shifting tax benefits that are permissible under current tax rules and
judicial doctrine).
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C. The Costs of InstrumentalAccounting
Embracing explicit accounting incentives as a regular tool of public policy
would result in numerous dislocations and costs. First, although positive
accounting theorists focus on contracting costs from an issuer's perspective,
there are other parties to these contracts. Earnings-increasing changes in
standards could result in some shifting of wealth from creditors to debtors.
Second, instrumental use of accounting standards necessitates accepting
deviations from accounting rules that most closely reflect the economic reality
of various transactions. Such deviations entail costs arising from degradation
of the information content of financial statements. Third, shifting the venue of
some governmental economic intervention to the accounting arena would result
in a shift and perhaps an increase in lobbying activity, and we might worry
whether the standard-setting process would be particularly susceptible to
regulatory capture. Fourth, incorporating explicit accounting incentives into
U.S. GAAP could undermine international convergence of accounting
standards. Finally, there are a number of inefficiencies associated with
providing incentives through the tax code, such as misplaced administrative
responsibility, that might also apply to accounting incentives.
1. Impact on CorporateCreditors
Under the debt covenant theory, an accounting standard change that
increases/decreases reported earnings, loosens/tightens sticky covenants,
leading to an indirect increase/decrease in the share price of leveraged firms
affected by the accounting change. Of course, there is another party to these
debt covenants, the lender, and to some extent the shareholders' gains or losses
are offset by losses or gains to the lender. Imagine an accounting standard
change that decreases reported earnings, pushing a corporation closer to
violation of its debt covenants and costly default. Clearly this is costly for the
firm, but the lender may benefit. Companies may take other steps that reduce
the risk of default that they would not otherwise have taken. In other words,
companies may reduce the risk of actual default to offset the increased risk of
technical default arising from the change in standards, and that benefits the
lender. Positive accounting theory suggests that there will be an overall
economic loss in this situation. Presumably, the corporate borrower and lender
negotiated the ideal debt covenant based on previous accounting standards and
the change in standard results in a suboptimal outcome. Nonetheless, the net
economic loss is likely to be less than the loss to the shareholders.
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By the same token, an earnings-increasing change in accounting standards
pushes debtor corporations further from the brink of insolvency, reducing the
expected cost of technical default, but because the standard change has no
effect on the risk of actual default, the change undermines the protection
afforded by the debt covenants, which is costly to lenders. Again, this is
unlikely to be a "zero-sum" effect, assuming, reasonably, that renegotiation of
the covenants is not costless. The point, however, is that there is no free lunch.
The benefit to debtors from earnings-increasing standard changes is costly to
lenders.
However, these effects are likely to be modest. As noted above, corporate
borrowers and lenders increasingly appear to be basing debt covenants on a
mixture of GAAP and non-GAAP rules or locking the rules into place at the
time covenants are negotiated.27 7 Adoption of instrumental accounting as a
regular tool of public policy would likely lead to an acceleration of that trend.278
2. Degradationof the Usefulness of FinancialReports
There is an old debate in the academic accounting literature as to whether
nonaccounting social welfare effects should be taken into account in setting
standards. The accounting purists argued that the "economic consequences" of
accounting standards should be ignored, that the rules should be as neutral as
possible and avoid "influencing behavior in any particular direction. 2 79 The
concern of the purists was that adjusting standards to reflect nonaccounting
consequences would lead to a loss of credibility and confidence in GAAP.28 °
Opposed were academics who believed that accounting neutrality was
unattainable,281 that standard setters historically had considered nonaccounting
277. Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
278. Of course, a move in this direction undermines one of the potential explanations for
the behavioral power of accounting. However, as discussed in Part IV.C, supra, the debt
covenant hypothesis may not be the most persuasive explanation for corporate response to
accounting rules over the long haul.
279. FACTS ABouT FASB, supra note 197, at 2. See also DAVID SOLOMONS, MAKING
ACCOUNTING PoLIcY 233-35 (1986) (arguing the importance of accounting neutrality); Victor
H. Brown, Accounting Standards: Their Economic and Social Consequences, 4 ACCT.
HoRizoNs 89, 95-96 (same).
280. Brown, supranote 279, at 94. See also SOLOMONS, supranote 279, at 232 ("[I]n the
long run accounting can retain its credibility only if it does what it is designed to do-provide
society with relevant and reliability information about economic events and transactions-and
does not attempt to move the economy in one direction rather than another.").
281. See David M. Hawkins, FinancialAccounting, the StandardsBoardand Economic
Development, SAXE LECTURES IN ACCT., Nov. 12, 1973, http://newman.baruch.
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"economic consequences" in promulgating rules,282 and that it was the
affirmative obligation of the standard setter to take these economic
consequences into account.28 3 This debate has quieted in recent years, and it
would appear that the purists won the aspirational battle, at least. Recent FASB
statements uniformly embrace the economic neutrality objective.2 84 The only
"economic consequence" recognized by the FASB as having a legitimate role in
standard setting is the economic benefit of changes "that result[] in financial
statements that are more relevant
and representationally faithful, and thus more
2 85
making."
decision
for
useful
Although unstated, presumably the central concern of the GAAP purists
was that a loss of credibility or confidence in GAAP would be costly. If
audited financial statements become less credible, reliable, or useful as a result
of consequential changes in standards, users of these statements would be
forced to seek alternative sources of data, negotiate more protective agreements,
or simply accept greater risk in dealing with an issuer, all of which is costly.
As highlighted by recent literature from the book-tax conformity debate,
the more general worry is that departures from financial accounting neutrality
286
would have adverse effects on the value-relevance of financial statements.
However, not all departures from existing financial accounting standards are
equally problematic. For example, Hanlon and Shevlin consider the effect on
conforming depreciation techniques, specifically using the accelerated tax
depreciation rules for financial reporting. In this case, they argue that the
change would result in a "minimal" loss of information "because economic
depreciation of an 87
asset does not follow either [the tax or book depreciation
2

method] exactly.

cuny.edu/digital/saxe/saxe_1973/hawkins_73.htm (arguing that all accounting standards
influence economic behavior) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
282. See Stephen A. Zeff, The Rise of "Economic Consequences," 146 J. ACCT. 56, 58
(1978) (providing examples of accounting rules being influenced by economic consequences).
283. See Hawkins, supra note 281 ("[Bjecause the Standards Board has the power to
influence economic behavior it has an obligation to support the government's economic
plans.").
284. See, e.g., FACTS ABOUT FASB, supra note 197, at 2 (stating as an objective of the
board that it "ensure... the neutrality of information resulting from its standards").
285. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ExPosuRE DRAFT: PROPOSED STATEMENT OF
FINANcIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, app. c para. C34 (Mar. 2004),
availableat http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed sbpappc.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
286. See Hanlon et al., supra note 190, at 2 (arguing that value relevance could be
undermined "if standard setting and GAAP is captured by tax rule-makers, policy makers, and
politicians").
287. Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 12, at 29.
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More generally (and obviously), deviating from neutrality in order to
provide accounting incentives results in costly information loss to the markets
only if information is truly lost. As long as the standards are unambiguous,
shifting from straight-line financial depreciation to some explicit decelerated
depreciation method should have minimal informational impact. Even more
clearly, shifting an expense from income statement to footnote should have no
impact on information, just as shifting options expense from the footnotes to
the income statement will have no informational impact.28 8
Thus, while deviating from neutral accounting principles in order to
provide incentives would inevitably result in some degradation in the valuerelevance of financial statements, the impact could be limited by focusing on
the presentation of information, i.e., shifting expenses to footnotes, and
maintaining the overall substance of the information provided. 28 9 Adverse
impact could be limited further by being highly selective in adopting the
instrumental accounting approach. For example, given the inherent difficulty
of matching depreciation schedules to economic depreciation, the informational
cost of adjusting financial depreciation schedules to spark investment might be
modest. Overall, the impact of limited deviations that are carefully
implemented to preserve as much value-relevant information as possible would
likely be small.
3. Lobbying, Regulatory Capture,and the Quality ofAccounting Incentives
Given the fundamental economic policy issues at stake, instrumental
accounting should be a tool utilized only by Congress, if at all. The FASB has
quite correctly refused to consider economic consequences in its standardsetting process. A private body of accountants is not equipped to weigh
nonaccounting issues and has no access to the competing means of economic
intervention available to Congress. Thus, embracing instrumental accounting
would entail relocating some responsibility for the standard-setting process
288. Keep in mind that there may be other costs or benefits associated with these
adjustments, such as contracting cost effects, but the claim here is that these cosmetic changes
need not result in degradation of information made available to the market. For example,
shifting an expense from earnings statement to footnote for instrumental purposes should not be
interpreted by the market as a signal that the information has become less important or reliable.
289. One might argue, and it could be true, that an earnings-increasing accounting
incentive would be less effective if the only change was to shift an expense from the body of the
financial statement into a footnote providing a pro forma earnings calculation undoing the
change. However, this has been the situation with stock option expensing over the last decade,
and that "incentive" has been very successful.
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from the FASB to Congress. Primary responsibility could remain with the
FASB, with Congress intervening from time to time with respect to particular
standards, or following the tax model, primary responsibility could be shifted to
Congress with implementation entrusted to a governmental agency or perhaps
the FASB. In either scenario, however, we should expect increased lobbying
over standards, worry about the potential for capture by managerial interests,
and question the quality of instrumental standards that would be promulgated.
While a benevolent, disinterested, and omniscient social planner could make
positive use of instrumental accounting, the politics of standard setting should
lead us to question whether adding instrumental accounting to the regulatory
tool-kit would increase or decrease social welfare.
There is certainly reason to be concerned about lobbying costs and
regulatory capture if instrumental accounting were to become the norm.
Corporate managers would have a very strong interest in lobbying Congress
(and whatever committees Congress empowered to oversee financial
accounting) for earnings-increasing standards, and it is not at all clear that there
would be any effective lobbying interests countering them.29 ° Creditors would
be hurt by earnings-increasing standards that undermined the protection of debt
covenants, but dispersed bond holders, for example, should not be expected to
form an effective lobby. Moreover, although auditors and accountants certainly
have an interest in accounting standards, they are more likely to be concerned
about the consistency and ease of administration of the rules than their
substance.
Accounting commentators have worried that eliminating economic
neutrality as a guiding principle of the standard-setting process would lead to a
lobbying frenzy and severely undermine principled standard setting. 291 That is
not to say that lobbying does not occur today or that it is totally ineffective.
There is evidence that corporations effectively lobby the FASB.29 2 But casual
290. For a brief discussion of the determinants of lobbying effort and expenditure, see
supra note 211 and accompanying text.
291. See David Solomons, The Political Implications of Accounting and Accounting
Standard Setting, 13 AcCT. & Bus. RES. 107, 114 (1983) (noting "general agreement among
accountants that anything that can limit the area of political disagreement in accounting will be
beneficial"); Hanlon et al., supra note 190, at 37 (suggesting that Congress as a political body
would be more susceptible than the FASB to lobbying); Press Release, Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd., Financial Accounting Foundation Trustees Issue Statement Opposing Legislative
Proposals to Curb FASB Independence (June 14, 2004) (voicing concern regarding "Congress
send[ing] the message that special interests are able, through legislation, to overturn expert
accounting judgment") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
292. See Brown & Feroz, supranote 208, at 727-29 (finding that the FASB is influenced
by corporate comment letters and that larger corporations have more influence than smaller
ones); see also, Edward B. Deakin, RationalEconomicBehavior and Lobbying on Accounting
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observation suggests that corporate lobbying with respect to accounting standards
does not approach lobbying of tax writers. Perhaps that is because managers care
more about taxes than reported earnings, but I strongly doubt it. It is more likely
that the difference arises from the belief that the FASB, with its focus on
from
neutrality, rejection of nonaccounting policy considerations, and insulation
293
the electoral process, is less susceptible to lobbying than Congress.
Congress has rarely intervened in the standard-setting process, but its
occasional interventions give us some clues about the welfare implications of
instrumental accounting. Two examples demonstrate the promise and the peril.
One of the most significant interventions by Congress and the SEC in substantive
standards occurred in the early 1960s after Congress enacted an investment tax
credit.294 Although the tax legislation provided for immediate "flow-through" tax
benefits, the Accounting Principles Board (the FASB's predecessor) issued an
opinion requiring, for financial reporting purposes, that the tax benefits be spread
over the lives of the assets purchased.29 5 That conservative approach reduced the
favorable earnings impact of the tax legislation (versus a parallel flow-through
financial accounting approach). The accounting profession was split on the
proper treatment, but business leaders lobbied hard for flow-through
296
The SEC took the unusual step of overturning the APB's opinion
accounting.
with its own opinion allowing either accounting method to be used.297 About a
decade later, Congress enacted a new version of the investment tax credit and
specified in the legislation that either accounting approach would be acceptablea rare case of Congress engaging in instrumental accounting. 298 In my view, these
Issues: Evidencefrom the Oil and Gas Industry, 64 ACCT. REv. 137, 150 (1989) (investigating
lobbying on accounting for oil and gas producing activities and finding that contracting and
cash flow effects were correlated with lobbying activity).
293. According to the economic theory of regulation, lobbying expenditure is a function of
the potential payoff from lobbying. Supra note 211 and accompanying text. All else being
equal, the expected return on lobbying a more compliant regulator is greater than the return on
lobbying a less compliant regulator.
294. See Gary John Previts & Dale L. Flesher, A Perspective on the New Deal and
FinancialReporting: Andrew Barrand the SecuritiesExchange Commission, 1938-1972,23
Bus. & EcoN. His. 221, 226 (1994) (discussing the controversy over the 7% investment tax
credit enacted under President John Kennedy).
295. See Joel Seligman, The SEC and Accounting: A HistoricalPerspective, in THE SEC
THE FIRST 50 YEARS: 1984 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARTHUR YOUNG
AND ACCOUNTING:
PROFESSORS' ROUNDTABLE, supra note 193, at 19 (discussing the "flow-through" and deferral
methods of accounting for the tax credit); Previts & Flesher, supra note 294, at 221 (discussing
the Accounting Principles Board's reaction to the tax credit).
296. See Seligman, supra note 295, at 19 (documenting a split of opinion among the "Big
Eight" accounting firms between the flow-through and the deferral methods).
297. Id.; Previts & Flesher, supra note 294, at 226; Solomons, supra note 291, at 117.
298. Previts & Flesher, supra note 294, at 226.
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were positive interventions. By permitting flow-through accounting of the tax
benefits, Congress and the SEC boosted the incentive provided by the investment
tax credit with little loss of information to the financial markets.
The other example involves only threatened intervention and takes us back
to the stock option expensing story. As discussed above, the FASB struggled for
a decade before successfully implementing a requirement that stock option
expense be recognized consistently with other forms of compensation. Corporate
interests strongly resisted this earnings-reducing change in standards and several
times enlisted the help of various members of Congress in pressuring the FASB
to slow or water down its proposals. To be fair, other members of Congress
supported the FASB's efforts, but had the primary responsibility for this standard
rested with Congress, I have no doubt that the corporate interests would have
prevailed. Expensing stock options will discourage their use and the new
standard can be seen as an unwarranted brake on a popular compensation
technique. In my view, the old option expense footnoting regime provided an
inappropriate accounting preference for one particular type of compensation,
leading to inefficient distortions in pay practices, i.e., over-reliance on options,
and a particular form of options at that. The problem, of course, is that this story
is not about a difference of opinion regarding the merits of stock options, it is
about managerial interests that differ from shareholder interests and the likelihood
that Congress will cater to management interests.
In my view, the problem of regulatory capture and the resulting likelihood
that a Congress that embraced instrumental use of accounting standards would
produce as many poor standards as good ones probably dooms the enterprise.
Perhaps this is an unduly pessimistic view of Washington, but the view seems
warranted. Of course, one can make the same point about tax incentives. The
difference is that congressional involvement in the tax writing process is
inevitable. That is not the case with the financial standard-setting process, but
more on that after we consider a few other potential costs and benefits of
instrumental accounting.
4. Institutionalizationof the Importance of Reported Earnings
The idea behind instrumental accounting is to harness managers' irrational
or rational but self-serving bias, which inflates the importance of reported
earnings, in order to shape corporate behavior and increase social welfare. There
is an inherent perversity in this idea, in that shareholder welfare would be
increased if managers could be educated or disciplined into abandoning the bias
in the first place. One might be concerned that explicit introduction of accounting
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incentives into GAAP would somehow institutionalize managers' earnings
fixation and lead us further from the happy day in which managers fully
understand and internalize the ECMH and positive accounting theory.
5. Conflict with InternationalConvergence ofAccounting Standards
In 2002, the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board
entered into a memorandum of understanding pledging to work towards "highquality, compatible accounting standards that could be used for both domestic and
cross-border financial reporting., 299 Currently, no single set of accounting
principles exists that is generally acceptable in all capital markets, and
international convergence would result in obvious efficiencies.
Incorporating explicit accounting incentives into U.S. GAAP could
undermine efforts to achieve international accounting convergence. For example,
financial depreciation schedules that were regularly adjusted to fine-tune the
incentives for U.S. companies to invest in certain asset classes would be
problematic for convergence and add to the administrative burden of foreign
firms attempting to list their shares on U.S. markets.
Without attempting to fully resolve this issue here, a number of observations
are in order. First, it would appear that the negative effect on international
convergence could be minimized by limiting accounting incentives to a few
discrete issues, such as financial depreciation, and by implementing the incentives
in such a way as to avoid information loss, e.g., by employing the stock option
"footnoting" technique. These are the same techniques that were suggested above
as a means of minimizing the loss of information in deviating from economic
accounting, so introduction of the international convergence issue simply
reinforces the reasons for cabining accounting incentives. Second, it should be
noted that calls for increased book-tax conformity raise the same issue unless one
believes that the systems would be conformed at economic accounting, which
seems unlikely. In both cases, the reduction in international convergence is a cost
of the proposal that must be weighed against the benefits.
6. Other Costs (andBenefits) ofInstrumentalAccounting
In a number of important articles and books, Stanley Surrey and Paul
McDaniel exposed the inefficiencies of providing business incentives through the
299. Memorandum of Understanding, The Norwalk Agreement 1 (Sept. 18, 2002),
http://www.fasb.org/news/memorandum.pdf

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHA VIOR

1005

tax system rather than through direct subsidies. 300 Accounting incentives would
share many, but not all, of these inefficiencies.
One of Surrey and McDaniel' s primary complaints was that tax incentives
bypass the congressional committees and regulatory agencies that have the
relevant subject matter expertise, e.g., agriculture, manufacturing, etc. 30 1 Not
only is there a loss of expertise when this occurs, but a loss of coordination.
Assuming that Congress patterned accounting incentive institutions on the tax
model, this complaint would be equally valid. Of course, this institutional
framework is not inevitable. Congress could decide that the various subject
matter committees could employ accounting incentives as a policy tool in
coordination with direct subsidies and other incentives. This alternative
approach could result in the opposite coordination problem, different
committees imposing different or conflicting accounting standards. This is not
the place to work out a detailed regulatory scheme for the promulgation of
accounting incentives, but two points should be emphasized: Coordination
problems and loss of expertise might arise in the promulgation of accounting
incentives, but the problems inherent in the tax model potentially could be
mitigated.
Another complaint was that tax incentives were open-ended. 0 2 Unlike
direct subsidies that had to pass through an appropriations process every year,
tax incentives, once enacted, historically remained in force until they were
eliminated or revised by future legislation. In recent years, this has begun to
change. In order to hold down deficit projections, tax subsidies increasingly
are enacted for a limited period and must be affirmatively renewed to continue
in force.303 Because accounting incentives have no direct effect on the public
fisc, it is likely that accounting incentives would be open-ended like tax
incentives were historically.
A further concern was that tax incentives damage the tax system through
introducing complexity and inconsistency. 3°4 This risk would exist for
accounting incentives as well. Ideally, Congress would impose just a few
300.

See generally STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EPENDITURES (1985);

STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS To TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TA EXPENDITURES (1973);

Surrey, supranote 272.
301.

SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 300, at 106; Surrey, supra note 272, at 728.

302. Surrey, supra note 272, at 729-30, 730 n.34.
303. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168(k) (Supp. IV 2005) (titled "Special [Depreciation] Allowance
for Certain Property Acquired After September 10, 2001, and Before January 1, 2005").
304.

See SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 300, at 105-06 (arguing that "[m]uch of the

complexity of our tax law derives from the tax expenditure provisions"); Surrey, supranote 272,
at 731-32 (suggesting that introducing tax incentives results in a "blurring of concepts and
objectives").
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narrowly tailored accounting incentives that were designed to preserve relevant
financial information while encouraging worthwhile economic behavior. But it
is entirely possible that once the camel's nose breached the tent, we would
wind up with a volume of accounting standards that rivaled the tax code. This
issue is sufficiently serious that it is discussed more fully in the next section.
Accounting incentives would be similar to tax incentives in other ways.
Both mechanisms generally are very blunt tools for economic intervention.
Consider the corporate deduction for charitable contributions. For firms paying
tax at the top marginal rate, this deduction amounts to a 35% governmental
subsidy for charitable gifts. Is it likely that Congress actually thinks that 35% is
the right level of subsidy? Why not 25% or 50%? And what about the startup
firm with tax losses that can be carried forward for many years? The effective
subsidy in that case rapidly approaches zero. Is that what Congress intended?
In some cases, principally tax depreciation and investment tax credits, Congress
has actively managed tax incentives. More often than not, however, they serve
as a very blunt instrument.
Accounting incentives would suffer from the same defect. Decelerated
financial depreciation could be fine tuned based on experience, but shifting an
expense from income statement to footnote would have a dollar for dollar
impact on reported earnings, whether this level of earnings impact would
provide the right level of incentive or not.
On the other hand, tax and accounting incentives share an advantage with
direct subsidies relative to legal mandates in allowing for heterogeneous
responses. Assuming that Congress merely wants to encourage an activity and
not require it, tax and accounting incentives, as well as direct subsidies, allow
businesses to determine whether the carrot is sufficiently attractive to merit the
change. However, all of these pros and cons are simply further factors to be
taken into account in determining whether instrumental accounting is a viable
tool for implementing government policy in a second-best world.
D. Thinking aboutAccounting Incentives in a Second-Best World
It may be useful to think about accounting incentives in the context of the
tax simplification debate. The issues are similar. Undoubtedly, the tax system
could be more efficiently administered if stripped of various economic
incentives such as the home mortgage interest deduction, the deduction for
charitable contributions, the earned income tax credit, and the exclusion for
employer provided health insurance. But we live in a second-best world.
Assuming one believes that government has a legitimate role to play in shaping
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economic behavior (or even if one believes that government inevitably will play
that role whether it is legitimate or not), the appropriate question is what
combination of tax rules, legal mandates, governmental spending programs,
and, perhaps, accounting standards, most efficiently raises the revenue, shapes
the behavior, delivers the services, and provides the information. Congress
only has so many levers it can use to direct economic behavior. None is costfree.
David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have recently made this point with
respect to tax incentives. As they say, "The government will, sometimes for the
better and sometimes for the worse, subsidize, penalize, or regulate various
activities, and we must decide how this should be done. 30 5 They argue that it
is a mistake to focus narrowly on the effect of tax incentives on the complexity
and efficiency of the tax code; rather, one must consider broader institutional
design considerations in determining whether it is appropriate to deliver
incentives through the tax code. 3°
A similar argument could be made for instrumental use of accounting.
Accounting researchers bemoan potential degradation of financial information,
but there is no reason to think that maximum value-relevance of financial
statements should supersede all other considerations. But there is also a
fundamental difference between accounting and tax.
Congressional
involvement in the federal tax system is irretrievably entrenched (if not
unavoidable), and thus lobbying and regulatory capture problems in this arena
are endemic. This is not true of financial accounting. With one or two
exceptions, Congress historically has not involved itself with substantive
accounting rules. We should, therefore, think twice before inviting the camel's
nose into this particular tent. While one can dream of an all-wise and wholly
public-spirited Congress tweaking one or two accounting rules to provide
helpful incentives to business, the nightmare scenario of one-off, special
interest driven accounting rules looms large. As noted above, the constituency
with the greatest interest in accounting standards and strongest incentive to
lobby is corporate management. 0 7 The concern, then, is not that inefficient
governmental economic intervention would simply shift from tax incentives or
direct subsidies to accounting incentives, but that opening up a new venue for
intervention would result in incremental social costs, including increased
lobbying and regulatory costs, that offset the advantages instrumental
accounting would provide.
305. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integrationof Tax andSpending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955, 964 (2004).

306. Id.
at 958-60.
307.
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Still, given the behavioral power of financial accounting standards, it is
tempting to propose limited consideration of accounting incentives, perhaps as
a tie-breaker in situations in which the proper accounting treatment of an item
is subject to legitimate debate within the accounting profession or possibly with
respect to items for which the accounting treatment is admittedly arbitrary to
begin with. A good example of the former case was the resolution of the
disagreement over the accounting treatment of the investment tax credit. But,
of course, distinguishing legitimate debate from concocted accounting
controversies designed to advance special interests would not be easy. I would
place the debate over the FASB's proposal to require expensing of
compensatory stock options in the latter category.
The best example of an arbitrary accounting standard is probably financial
depreciation. The benefits of allowing firms to utilize more decelerated
financial depreciation methods than are permissible today would seem to
outweigh the costs. But again, aspects of many standards could be deemed
arbitrary, and limiting intervention to this subset of standards would be
difficult.
If instrumental accounting could be limited to breaking ties in cases of
legitimate accounting controversy or adjusting arbitrary standards to take the
pressure off of tax incentives and direct subsidies, there could be significant
social gains. I would welcome suggestions along these lines. However,
without reason to think that intervention could be limited, the risks of
encouraging intervention seem to outweigh the gains.
VII. Conclusion
Using financial accounting standards to help shape corporate behavior is a
provocative idea, but whether instrumental accounting ultimately is embraced
as a public policy tool is to some degree secondary. The main argument of this
Article has been that accounting standards shape corporate behavior, whether
we recognize the fact or not, and that this power of accounting has important
public policy implications. We cannot adequately evaluate calls for increased
book-tax conformity or other proposals with accounting implications without
taking the incentive properties of accounting rules into consideration.
For what are proposals for increased book-tax conformity but calls for
instrumental accounting? Proponents seek to influence corporate behavior with
respect to tax sheltering and earnings inflation by adjusting the conventions of
book and tax accounting. Unless one believes that Congress would accept
GAAP for both, book-tax conformity inevitably involves changes in substantive

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

1009

financial accounting rules with all of the costs outlined in the previous Part.
Moreover, proponents of increased book-tax conformity should certainly
beware the rest of the camel. While increased conformity may be advantageous
in isolation, we should be concerned that encouraging Congress to intervene in
financial accounting in the name of conformity could start us down the road
towards wholesale politicization of the standard-setting process.
This much we can surmise, even though we lack confidence in our
understanding of why accounting has behavioral effects. However, in order to
fully evaluate the social welfare implications of instrumental accounting and
appreciate the nuanced effects of various book-tax conformity proposals, we
need a better understanding of the extent to which accounting effects reflect an
agency problem. I have argued that in cases like Kamin and managerial
resistance to stock option expensing, agency costs likely dominate shareholderregarding explanations, but much more evidence is needed.
Given the ever increasing complexity of corporate financial arrangements,
we can expect a steady flow of new FASB statements and interpretations.
Without a fuller understanding of the role of financial accounting in corporate
behavior, however, even avoiding inadvertent instrumental accounting may be
difficult.

